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In this issue we continue with our an­
nounced venture of a series of articles 
which seek to clarify fundamental concep­
tions of marxism in the world today.
In the last issue, we published an article 
by the British philosopher John Lewis on 
the French marxist Louis Althusser. In this 
issue, we publish Althusser’s reply to 
Lewis. Lewis’ article is one of the few that 
has elicited a response from Althusser him­
self. Readers can therefore judge the 
merits and demerits of the arguments ad­
vanced, and will, we hope, themselves 
enter into the discussion, which is certainly 
not exhausted by these two articles. This 
is an important exchange for it deals with 
one important area of theoretical differ­
ence within the world communist movement 
and within world marxism.
John Sinclair alsc deals with some re­
lated controversies. This brief article on 
one of the most important streams of marx­
ism this century tiaces its roots in Hegel 
and in Marx, and provides a stimulating 
discussion of the concept of negation in 
the thought of the Critical Theorists.
Russell Edwards’ article on the “ Counter- 
Culture" and revolution is also not un­
related, in the theoretical issues it raises.
Grant Evans, in his review of Sweezy’s 
and Magdoff's latest books on American 
capitalism also points to important theore­
tical differences which are becoming more 
acute within the field of marxist economics. 
On a somewhat different tack, Bernie Taft’s 
article on ACTU enterprises shows that 
such enterprises perform an integrative 
function for capitalism. To do this, he 
draws valuable lessons from the West Ger­
man experience.
The relation between democracy and edu­
cation under capitalism is being debated 
more frequently, and is becoming a central 
issue of struggle in the schools. Dean 
Ashenden’s article is one of several ALR 
plans to publish cn this subject.
We invite criticisrr comment, and contribu­
tions on all these and other issues.
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CRITICAL THEORY
John Sinclair
(The Institut fur Socialforschung was set up at Frank­
furt-am-Main in 1923. Horkheimer, whose father en­
dowed it, became director in 1930, and continued in 
exile after 1933, in France, and then in the United 
States. The Institute closed in 1941, with some members 
returning to Germany, and others, notably Fromm and 
Marcuse, remaining in the USA). Adorno and Horkheimer 
re-established the School at Frankfurt in 1950. Habermas 
(now at the Max Planck Institute) came in at that stage. 
Adorno died in 1969; Horkheimer is still alive. These 
three all moved to a conservative position, especially 
after the 1968 student revolts, which they denounced.)
This article is an attempt to define and asses what 
is known as critical theory. The perspective which 
is taken here is that there are common themes run­
ning through the work of Marx, Lukacs and the 
Frankfurt School, including its living exponents,
Marcuse and Habermas, and that although there are 
significant differences between these theorists, 
they all share a critical position.
The defining characteristic of this position is a 
critical and transcendent view of reality which en­
compasses the negation of the existing reality which 
presents itself to us, and urges such negation in prac­
tice in order to liberate the possibilities for man imm­
anent in that reality. This characteristic will usually 
be referred to in this essay as the critical position, a 
term which will be used in a general way to include 
also themes concomitant with this characteristic.
“The truth is the whole.” Hegel’s dictum is the 
point of departure for critical theory, but it is in 
Marx that it acquires its material relevance. I intend 
to base my explication of Marx’s critical theory 
upon Marcuse’s lucid statement of “The Marxian 
Dialectic.” (1)
Both Hegel and Marx, says Marcuse, saw the neg­
ative character of reality, and truth was only to be
1. H. Marcuse: “Reason and Revolution: Hegel and 
the Rise o f Social Theory” (Routledge, London,
1968 c. 1941) pp. 312-322.
John G. Sinclair is a Lecturer in Sociology at the 
Footscray Institute of Technology.
found in the “negative totality” . The elements of 
transcendence and negation are already apparent - 
the truth was the whole, and the whole was reality 
as it presented itself to us, plus the negation of 
that reality as discerned in its negativity, which 
was its motor. It was only in the context of the 
negative totality, said Marx, that the process and 
structure of social reality could be understood, for 
it enabled one to see through the reification and 
mystification of class society to its contradictions.
The difference between the Hegelian and the 
Marxian dialectic, as Marcuse points out, is that
the former was “ .....a universal ontological one
in which history was patterned on the metaphys­
ical process of being,” whilst the latter was his­
torically specific and materialist. (“The critic ... 
can ... develop the true actuality out of the forms 
inherent in existing actuality as its ought-to-be and 
goal.” (2) Similarly, his materialism is evident in 
“The German Ideology,” especially on the first 
few pages where he says that his premises “ ... 
are men, not in any fantastic isolation and fixation, 
but in their real, empirically perceptible process 
of development under certain conditions.” (3)
It is Marx’s view of the negative totality of social 
reality that has come to be called “dialectical 
materialism” . But there is more to dialectical 
materialism than this, and it is now that we see 
the defining characteristic of critical theory:
“The historical character of the Marxian dialectic 
embraces the prevailing negativity (that is, the con­
tradictions of class society) as well as its negation.
The given state of affairs is negative and can be ren­
dered positive only by liberating the possibilities imm­
anent in it. This last, the negation of the negation 
(obviously not in the same sense as Hegel used the 
term) is accomplished by establishing a new order 
of things.”
2. Marx’s letter to Ruge, September 1843, in L.D. 
Easton and K.H. Guddat (eds.) “ Writings of 
the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society” 
(Doubleday Anchor, New York, 1967) p. 213.
3. “The German Ideology,” ibid., p. 415.
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The negativity and its negation are two different 
phases of the same historical process, straddled 
by man’s historical action. The new state is the 
truth of the old, but that truth does not steadily 
and automatically grow out of the earlier state; 
it can be set free only by an autonomous act on 
the part of men, that will cancel the whole of the 
existing negative state.” (4)
The negation of negativity then, is not inevitable 
nor is it just a philosophical conception as far as 
Marx is concerned -- rather, it needs conscious 
action to bring it about. Thus, two consequential 
elements which emerge from Marx’s critical 
theory are the emphasis on consciousness, and the 
emphasis on Praxis, both of which are necessary 
to bring about negation and therefore central to 
the critical position. For Marx, the conscious and 
acting men who were to bring this about were the 
proletariat:
“Heralding the dissolution o f the existing order o f 
things, the proletariat merely announces the secret 
o f its own existence because it is the real dissolution 
of this order.” (5) The object of the negation of the 
proletariat’s negativity was human emancipation:
“The role of emancipator ... finally reaches the class 
which actualises social freedom, no longer assuming 
certain conditions external to man and yet created by 
human society but rather organising all the conditions 
of human existence on the basis o f social freedom. ” 
(6)
Marx was aware, however, of the difficulties which 
capitalism put against the attainment of consciousness 
and the inspiration to Praxis:
“The class having the means of material production 
has also control over the means of intellectual prod­
uction, so that it also controls, generally speaking, 
the ideas of those who lack the means of intellectual 
production.” (7)
Similarly, science and philosophy were subject to the 
mystification of capitalism:
“Science was either pressed ‘into the service’ of 
capital or degraded to the position of a leisurely pas­
time remote from any concern with the actual 
struggles of mankind, while philosophy undertook in 
the medium of abstract thought to guard the solutions 
to man’s problems of needs, fears and desires.” (8)
4. Marcuse, op. cit., p. 315 (original stress).
5. Marx: Introduction to “Toward the Critique of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Law” in Easton and Guddat, 
op. cit., p. 263, (original stress).
6. ibid., p. 262 (added stress).
7. Marx: “The German Ideology” in ibid., p. 438.
8. Marcuse, op.cit., p. 321 (original stress). This is 
ironic in view of subsequent developments.
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What then, were the implications of Marx’s thought 
for philosophy and sociology? Marcuse answers:
“The material connection of his theory with a defin­
ite historical form of practice negated not only philos­
ophy but sociology as w ell... The fundamental relations 
of the Marxian categories are not within the reach of 
sociology or of any science that is preoccupied with 
describing and organising the objective phenomena of 
society. They will appear as facts only to a theory that 
takes them in the preview of their negation. According 
to Marx, the correct theory is the consciousness of a 
practice that aims at changing the world.” (9)
We can now see, particularly in this last statement, the 
defining characteristic and the concomitant themes of 
critical theory as it is found in Marx: the critical and 
transcendent view of reality as negative totality, which, 
given a materialistic cast, saw through the ideology of 
class society to reveal its contradictions and made poss­
ible the negations of this negativity. This could only be 
done through the proletariat acting with this conscious­
ness to liberate the human possibilities immanent in 
class society, that is, negating it by creating socialism.
This is the critical position as found in Marx and which 
is carried through to a greater or lesser degree in Lukacs 
and the Frankfurt School.
Lukacs’ What is Orthodox Marxism?, a polemic against 
Bernstein and other revisionists, clearly places him in the 
critical theory tradition. (10) He emphasises, like Marx, 
the method of dialectical materialism, the relationship 
of theory and practice, historical specificity, capitalism’s 
use of science and so on. However, with Lukacs is found 
a movement away from Hegel and the concept of negative 
totality when he insists on the importance of the 
“concrete totality.”
Starting from Marx’s dictum that “the relations of 
production form a whole,” Lukacs lays emphasis on 
the historical character of reality, and argues that the 
reality which we experience (as distinct from the neg­
ative totality) must be viewed holistically and histor­
ically, but further, that we must also come to know 
“the concrete totality i.e. the conceptual reproduction 
of reality.” (11) That is to say, it is only by seeing 
past the concepts through which capitalism reproduces 
itself that we can see its real contradictions.
It is this consideration that leads Lukacs, as it was 
later to lead Habermas, to an emphasis on the critique
9. ibid., cf. Marx’s Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach;also 
“As philosophy finds its material weapons in the 
proletariat, the proletariat finds its intellectual 
weapons in philosophy.”
Marx, in Easton and Guddat, op. cit., p. 263 
(original stress).
10. Georg Lukacs: “What is Orthodox Marxism?” 
in his “History and Class Consciousness”
(Merlin Press, London, 1968) pp. 1-26.
11. ibid., p. 8 (stress added).
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of ideology and a corresponding emphasis on reificat­
ion and the problem of consciousness. Lukacs’ argu­
ment is made clearest when he says:
“The fetishistic illusions enveloping all phenomena 
in capitalist society succeed in concealing reality, but 
more is concealed than the historical, i.e. transitory, 
ephemeral nature of the phenomena. This concealment 
is made possible by the fact that in capitalist society 
man’s environment, and especially the categories of 
economics, appear to him immediately and necessar­
ily in forms of objectivity which conceal the fact that 
they are the categories of the relations o f men with 
each other. Instead they appear as things and the 
relations of things with each other. Therefore, when 
the dialectical method destroys the fiction of the 
immortality of the categories it also destroys their 
reified character and clears the way to a knowledge 
of reality.” (12)
This echoes Marx, certainly, but in the emphasis on 
knowing the reality of the ideological superstructure, 
it appears that Lukacs’ emphasis here is quite differ­
ent to the Hegelian and Marxian emphasis on the 
negativity of reality. However, whilst this may be so, 
Lukacs comes back to Marx and Hegel when he sees 
the proletariat as the negations of capitalism:
“ ... for the proletariat the total knowledge of its 
class-situation was a vital necessity ... its class situat­
ion becomes comprehensible only if the whole of 
society can be understood ... this understanding is 
the inescapable pre-condition of its actions ... From 
its own point of view, self-knowledge coincides with 
knowledge of the whole so that the proletariat is at 
one and the same time the subject and object of its 
own knowledge.” (13) Thus, for Lukacs, as with 
Marx, critical theory is clearly identified with the 
proletariat, an identification which later was to be 
lost in critical theory.
Although I have previously used the term “critical 
theory” in regard to Marx and to Lukacs, for reasons 
already given, it is most clearly associated with the 
work of the Frankfurt School: mainly Horkheimer, 
Adorno,* Marcuse and Habermas.
In regard to the term itself, an orthodox Marxist 
critic of the Frankfurt School, Goran Therbom, 
points out that Horkheimer used the term “mater­
ialism” rather than “critical theory” at first; that 
Adorno saw critical theory as an attempt to bring 
materialism “ to theoretical self-consciousness;” 
and that the phrase derives “ from the conventional 
description of Marxism as the critique of political 
economy.” (14)It would appear, then, that there
12. ibid., p. 14 (stress original).
13. ibid., p. 20. One commentator on Lukacs, Istvan 
Meszaros, has remarked that this “out-Hegels 
Hegel.”
14. Goran Therbom: “The Frankfurt School,” New 
Left Review, 63, Sept.-Oct. 1970, p. 67.
is at least nominal continuity between Marx, Lukacs, 
and the Frankfurt School: however, Therbom’s 
judgment is that “Critical theory is primarily a prise 
de position (Haltung) and only secondarily a theory 
of a specific type.” Further, he says that “the content 
of critical theory was essentially indeterminate.” (15)
I share sufficient reservation with Therbom to incline 
me to use the phrase “critical position,” as indicated 
above, when trying to discern the continuities in all 
the theorists with whom I am deeding. However, whilst 
being aware of emphasising similarity at the expense 
of distinction, it seems to me that with Horkheimer’s 
statements that the critical theorist is “ the theoretician 
whose only concern is to accelerate a development 
which should lead to a society without exploitation” 
and that “Critical theory explains: it must not be like 
this, men could alter being, the conditions for doing 
so already exist,” (16) the continuity is more than 
nominal with Marcuse’s judgment on Marx, cited above: 
“According to Marx, the correct theory is the conscious­
ness of a practice that aims at changing the world.” (17)
However, the radical programme which Horkheimer 
set out in 1937 was not and has not been realised by the 
Frankfurt School -  on the contrary, the School has been 
characterised by a marked retreat from practice, espec­
ially from practice identified with the proletariat. This 
marks a clear break with Lukacs and with Marx, who 
saw clearly that “real liberation can be achieved only 
in the real world and with real means ... ‘Liberation’ 
is a historical and not a mental act.” (18)
Therbom argues that the Frankfurt School’s retreat is 
characterised by a “ double reduction of science and 
politics to philosophy.” (19) Therbom apparently shares 
Marx’s attraction to positivism and materialism: “Where 
speculation ends, namely in actual life, there, real, posit­
ive science begins as the representation of the practical 
activity and practical process of the development of men 
... Apart from actual history ... abstractions have in 
themselves no value whatsoever.” (20)
It is from a similar position that Therbom criticises the 
Frankfurt School. He argues that the School’s critical 
theory is rooted in the tradition of classical philosophy 
by virtue of its idealism and objective view of truth which 
leads to the use of a “metaphysical humanism” as its epist- 
emology. This in turn leads to a critique of political econ­
omy, as with Marx, but its transcendence of bourgeois econ 
omics “ leaves its system of concepts in tac t... It leaves
15. ibid., p. 68.
16. Horkheimer, cited in ibid.
17. Marcuse, op. cit., p. 321.
18. Marx, “ German Ideology,” op. cit., p. 437
19. Therbom, op. cit., p. 74.
20. Marx, “German Ideology,” op. cit., p. 415. _
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everything as it is.” (21)
Also, in regard to the relationship of critical theory to 
the proletariat,* Therbom argues that Horkheimer’s pro­
gramme is vague and unsure, and that -
“Critical theory’s conception of politics also ends in a 
paradox. On the one hand, it presents itself as a mere com­
ponent of a political practice; on the other, it lacks any 
specific political anchorage. This is not just a description 
of its historical situation after the victory of Nazism in 
Germany, but a rigorous consequence of Frankfurt School 
theory.
The over-politicisation of theory leads logically to the 
substitution of theory as a surrogate for politics -  an 
Ersatz-politik. ” (22) (Therbom goes on to discuss the 
continuities of the Frankfurt School with Lukacs in its 
critique of science as contemplation, which in time 
moved to a critique of science as domination. This elem­
ent reaches its apogee in Habermas, to be discussed 
below.)
Like Lukacs, and like Marx, critical theory takes the 
Hegelian view of history as an unfolding, as the realis­
ation of the subject, such that conscious action to negate 
the negativity of capitalism realises socialism. Therbom’s 
essential criticism here of this view is that it is non- 
scientific and non-materialist, but what leads him to this 
view, apart from his own bias towards science, is his 
concentration on the “social totality” rather than on 
the “negative totality.” In looking for the Frankfurt 
School’s continuities with Marx, then, it becomes a 
question of which element is dominant in Marx -  posit­
ivism (“scientific socialism” ) or Hegelianism. Therbom 
argues from the former, this essay from the latter, so 
that my own judgment on this theoretical score is that 
the critical position is maintained through Marx, Lukacs 
and the Frankfurt School.
However, the question of the relationship of theory 
and practice is another one entirely, and it is clearly 
demonstrable that the post-War developments in the 
Frankfurt School, with an exception perhaps in the case 
of Marcuse, have led to the retreat from practice to pure 
philosophy and to individual reflection rather than social 
emancipation, and to the academic integration of the 
School as well as the embourgeoisement of its individual 
members, as Therbom shows. One can only agree with 
Therbom’s judgment that:
“The effect of the combined factors of formal present­
ation of the theory, exclusive individualisation and acad­
emic integration is a cumulative mystification. The form­
ula here provides a legitimation for a purely ideological 
radicalism smugly installed in the cosy academic instit­
ution, without even an indirect relationship to politics
as experienced by the masses but still cultivating a 
critical theory going back to an interpretation of Marx.” 
(23)
Bearing in mind the distinction between critical 
theory as theory and the relationship of the theory 
to practice, we now pass to the two most influential 
living Frankfurters, Marcuse and Habermas. In regard 
to this distinction, Marcuse can be said to maintain 
the relationship of theory to practice in practice, 
although his theory is open to Therbom’s criticism 
of the Frankfurt School. For Marcuse, critical theory 
is concerned to analyse the contradictions of society, 
its modes of domination and its ideology (or “con­
crete totality” as Lukacs puts it.)
“ ... in the light of its used and unused or abused 
capabilities for improving the human condition ... 
critical theory must abstract from the actual organis­
ation and utilisation of society’s resources ... Such 
abstraction which refuses to accept the given universe 
of facts as the final context of validation, such ‘trans­
cending’ analysis of the facts in the light of their arr­
ested and denied possibilities, pertains to the very 
structure of social theory. It is opposed to all meta­
physics by virtue of the rigorously historical charac­
ter of the transcendence ...” (24)
However, because, as Marcuse argues, society has 
become “one-dimensional,” and absorbed the prolet­
ariat, “ in the absence of demonstrable agents and 
agencies of social change, the critique is thus thrown 
back to a high level of abstraction. There is no ground 
on which theory and practice, thought and action 
m eet... ” (25)
All the elements of the critical position which were 
identified above can be seen clearly here -- immanent 
critique in terms of real possibilities, the historical and 
materialist elements, the aim of human liberation, 
transcendence of reality -- however, Marcuse’s analysis 
at this stage leads him away from Praxis “in the absence 
of demonstrable agents and agencies of social change” -  
not just the proletariat, but anyone. Thus, “ the analysis 
is forced to proceed from a position ‘outside’ the pos­
itive as well as negative, the productive as well as 
destructive tendencies in society.” (26) Thus, Marcuse 
finds himself in the same dilemma as his peers at 
Frankfurt -- having the critical position, but no group 
with which it might be identified.
Whilst it might be argued that Marcuse’s One Dimen­
sional Man shows precisely how this dilemma has come 
about, Marcuse’s critics are keen to point out that he
23. ibid., p. 86. Elsewhere he uses the fitting term 
“hyper-radicalism.”
24. Herbert Marcuse, “One Dimensional Man” (Sphere
21. Therbom, op. cit., p. 70. Books, London, 1968 c. 1964) pp. 9-10.
22. ibid., p. 73. 25. ibid., pp. 11-12.
* See note 9 above. 26. ibid., p. 13.
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was wrong -- if society really were one-dimensional, 
Marcuse could not have written a book like that: (27) 
the critical position would be impossible. Further, in 
“mistaking an interlude for an inexorable trend,” (28) 
Marcuse, like Daniel Bell of all people, failed to see 
the political resurgence which was to occur in the 
late ’sixties amongst the American Blacks, Third World 
revolutionaries and students in all capitalist countries. 
The irony in the latter case is that “They act in order 
to negate the reality he described, even if that entails 
negating his theory at the same time.” (29)
Marcuse is also criticised for alleged departures from 
Marx -  for emphasising culture at the expense of 
social structure, and consumption at the expense of 
production. (30) Marcuse could defend himself from 
most of these -- he has made himself aware of the new 
groups in opposition and addressed himself to them; 
he has modified his view of one-dimensionality, and 
re-asserted his Marxism. (31) However, the most 
telling criticism of Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man 
is that it is characterised by a “self-destructive 
hyper-radicalism.” (32) This criticism will be returned 
to later.
The last member of the Frankfurt School to be dis­
cussed is Jurgen Habermas, whose work represents 
a clear break with the other theorists discussed, al­
though certain continuities are still discernible: he 
can still be identified with the “critical position.”
Habermas’ argument that technology and science 
are at once the form of domination and legitimation 
in contemporary capitalist society (33) is certainly 
consistent with the critical position -  as seen above, 
this notion arose with Marx, was carried through by 
Lukacs and developed by Horkheimer. Similarly, his 
method is one of immanent critique (the defining 
characteristic of the critical position) seeing as he 
does the possibility of individual liberation through 
the rationalisation of communication. (34) However, 
the content of the immanent critique breaks with 
the critical position, moving from social to personal 
possibilities for liberation, but although this has come
27. Jerry Cohen, “Critical Theory: The Philosophy 
o f Marcuse,” New Left Review, 57, Sept.-Oct. 
1969, p. 44.
28. ibid., p. 45.
29. ibid., p. 48.
30. ibid. pp. 41ff., Therborn, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
31. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 46-7.
32. Therborn, op. cit., p. 88.
33. Jurgen Habermas, “Technology and Science as 
Ideology,” in his “Toward a Rational Society” 
(Heinemann, London, 1969) pp. 81-122.
a long way from Marx, it is not inconsistent with 
others of the post-war Frankfurt School, as noted 
above.
However, it is not Habermas’ conclusions so much 
that mark the departure, but how he arrives at them, 
taking as he does merely elements from Marx (whom 
he explicitly rejects otherwise (35) as well as from 
Freud and, of all people, Talcott Parsons. (36)
Further, his concern is more epistemological and 
ontological (37), rooted as it is in Erkenntnistheorie 
~ involving the three sorts of interests and their 
corresponding sciences and social mediation ~ rather 
than in Kritische Theorie.
On the other hand, Habermas, although rejecting 
the proletariat, did have an eye open for a group to 
bring about negation at the time of writing Science 
and Technology as Ideology, and this was the radical 
students. However, whereas Marcuse has exonerated 
himself as a practical critical theorist since One Dimen­
sional Man, Habermas has moved right away from the 
critical position since Science and Technology as 
Ideology with his denunciation of the students and 
his own absorption into the Max Planck Institute. 
Embourgeoisement came at an earlier age for Habermas 
than it did for Horkheimer or Adorno. Thus, even 
though Habermas may be broadly considered to take 
the critical position, his work is further apart from 
the other theorists considered than the distance of the 
difference between them.
I have now examined Marx, Lukacs, and the Frank­
furt School in terms of the critical position as I have 
defined it, and have found it present in the thought 
of each considered. It remains, however, to assess 
the Frankfurt School overall. In doing so, Therbom’s 
judgment is of interest:
“Critical theory rejects any positive presence in 
capitalist society (such as the proletariat) and seeks 
the purest negation, the negation o f the negation, 
as the essence of the revolution. This Hegelian notion 
of revolutionary change has played a central and 
disastrous role in Frankfurt thought. In their search 
for the absolute negations of the prevailing theoret­
ical and ideological discourse, the thinkers of the 
Frankfurt School feel forced to go outside both 
science, concrete social analysis, and formal logic, [sic] 
Horkheimer’s 1937 programme for a critical theory 
tried to find an Archimedean point outside society 
in order to uproot itself from the process of social 
reproduction. In the 1940s. Horkheimer and Adomo 
considered it necessary to go even further, formul­
ating their social critique only in philosophical 
fragments, because any continuous discourse was
35. ibid., p. 113.
36. Goran Therborn, “Jurgen Habermas: A New 
Eclecticism,” New Left Review, 67, May-June 
1871, pp. 73ff.
34. ibid., pp. 118ff. 37. ibid., p. 72.
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bound to lapse into positivity. The search for an 
absolute negation of the negation is also the ration­
ale for Marcuse’s retreat from Marxism in One 
Dimensional Man ... ” (38)
It is in the light of this that one sees the full impact 
of Therbom’s critique noted earlier. It is not a ques­
tion of the degree to which critical theory has stayed 
in the Marxist tradition -  this is a question of inter­
pretation of Marx: Marcuse’s own thought, for instance, 
seems consistent with his interpretation of Marx dis­
cussed above. (39) The flaw however, in Marcuse’s 
interpretation which lends validity to Therbom’s 
criticism is that Marcuse emphasised the negation 
of the negation at the expense of this aspect: “ ... 
the struggle with the ‘realm of necessity’ will con­
tinue with man’s passage to the stage of his ‘actual 
history’ and the negativity and the contradiction will 
not disappear.” (40) That is, the search for the absolute
38. Therborn, “Frankfurt School,” op. cit., p.91.
39. Marcuse, “ R. and R.,” op. cit., p. 315.
40. ibid., pp. 316-7 (stress added).
negation of the negation is futile. As Therborn notes, 
it leads to the search for an external negating subject 
at the expense of the analysis of structural contra­
dictions, and to an Hegelian concern with conscious­
ness, and to a preoccupation with ideological domin­
ation. (41)
But the argument that this is not Marxist is less im­
portant, and from my viewpoint, less valid, than the 
tendency of the search for pure negation to lead away 
from Praxis and social emancipation. That this is the case 
is evident from the foregoing, and it is in this sense that 
critical theory, through its retreat to philosophy and 
self-reflection, is self-destructive, for even though it 
maintains the critical position, it has done little to 
change society by its negation, except for Marcuse’s 
efforts and through its influence, by default, on radical 
students.
The philosophers continue to interpret the world, 
the point remains, to change it.
41. Therborn, “Frankfurt School” op. cit., pp.92-93.
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SHOULD TRADE UNIONS 
ENTER BUSINESS?
BernieTaft
The entry of the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions into retail business and its plans to enter 
into other spheres of business activity such as con­
sumer credit, insurance and housing have evoked 
very little serious discussion in the labor movement.
When the ACTU Executive resolved in August 
1971 that it favored in principle the ACTU enter­
ing these business activities, ACTU President Hawke 
described it as the most important decision ever 
made by the Executive.
The Executive also welcomed offers that had been 
conveyed to Bob Hawke by the West German trade 
union enterprises to provide assistance to the ACTU. 
Yet curiously this decision was endorsed by the 
ACTU Congress which followed it (August -Septem­
ber 1971) without producing a serious discussion 
about the aims, perspectives and likely consequences 
of such a step.
This is indeed strange. In March 1972 a German 
delegation of nine representatives of trade union- 
owned enterprises in the Federal Republic of Ger­
many visited Australia as guests of the ACTU to 
assist in the conduct of studies into the feasibility 
of the ACTU entering this range of economic acti­
vities.
The decision of the ACTU to enter into such enter­
prises has aroused more serious comment abroad 
than it has in Australia. Apparently the implications 
of involving the trade union movement in large-scale 
business operations is more clearly understood in a 
country like Germany, which is the model for these 
plans.
The German big business paper Handelsblatt in its 
issue of May 9,1972, devotes a long article to the 
ACTU plans under the heading: “Australian Trade 
Unions Re-think -  Employer Role in Accordance 
with the German Recipe Against being Strike-happy.”
These are some of its more significant comments:
“If the partnership between the ACTU and the DGB 
(German equivalent of the ACTU) works out, the 
surplus energies of the militant trade unions will be 
diverted to new functions -- the establishment of 
trade union industrial undertakings, according to 
the German pattern.”
“These ambitions of the Australian trade union 
movement signify a moving away from the hitherto 
official policy of socialisation of industry.”
The writer goes on to say that the Australian trade 
union movement “has become bogged down in the 
ideas of class struggle,” and bemoans the fact that 
“demands for co-determination with the employers 
in the industries have not yet forced their way 
through in Australia.”
Interestingly, this big business journal estimates 
that “ ... the help of the DGB in the establishment 
of trade union enterprises could contribute to the 
diminution of Marxist influence inside the Austra­
lian trade union movement.” And, “the DGB thrust 
into Australia is based on the conception to set the 
Australian trade union movement on the road to 
‘People’s Capitalism’ ... ”
The well-known West German paper Frankfurter 
Allgemeine (April 17,1972) in a detailed analysis 
under the heading “Australian Trade Unions Enter 
into Business Enterprises” notes that “The plans 
of the ACTU are apparently much further advanced 
than is frequently assumed in Australia. But in the 
final analysis this will be above all a question of fina­
nce... The other weakness of the plans is that at the 
moment the whole idea stands and falls with the per­
sonality of Bob Hawke.”
The comments, which reveal a considerable insight, 
highlight the paucity of discussion about these plans 
in Australia, as well as the fact that they have no real 
mass base. They stand or fall with one man. This 
raises some pertinent questions about democratic 
methods, about rank and file involvement in deci­
sion-making in the trade union movement.
It is certainly a serious state of affairs that plans 
are made to take the trade union movement in the 
direction of large-scale business undertakings with­
out an elaboration of the underlying conception 
and the social and economic perspectives involved, 
and without an informed public discussion.
The ACTU REVIEW  of July 31,1972, carries 
this comment by Bob Hawke:
“ Dividends from the ACTU Store will increase 
supporting unions’ funds for the benefit of their 
members.
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“Trade unionism, in its early and formative years, 
was heavily and almost exclusively focused on mat­
ters which can shortly be described as ‘industrial,’ 
that is, matters pertaining to hours of work, days 
of work, conditions of working, rates of pay, over­
time and other penalty provisions, staff amenities, 
holidays and sick leave. Whilst all of these things 
are of great importance in regulating relationships 
between employee and employer, they have no final 
bearing on the ultimate question of what effective 
standard of living is promoted for the mass of the 
community because they ignore the very vital mat­
ter of the purchasing power of the wage and salary 
earner’s takehome pay. To continue to increase, 
through bitter, difficult and prolonged struggles, 
the number of money units going to make up a 
pay packet loses much of its meaning, force and 
effect, if the purchasing power of those money un­
its is subject to continued and uncontrolled erosion, 
because of the inability of the consumer to exercise 
any restraining influence on the price levels.
“But now, shopping at the ACTU Store guarantees 
members a fair price and also enables them to take 
a personal part in the fight against retail exploitation.
“More support for Bourke’s will hasten the develop­
ment of other ACTU enterprises for the good of the 
whole community.”
Comments such as these can hardly be treated as a 
serious analysis of the economic and political issues 
and consequences inolved.
Bob Hawke knows very well what other factors are 
involved in inflation. West Germany, the model of 
this type of enterprise, has a high and even rising 
rate of inflation.
In the absence of a serious discussion it is little 
wonder that the ACTU plans have the support of 
a strangfe alliance of forces.
The Board of Directors of Bourke’s has Ralph 
Marsh, Rightwing Sydney Labor Council secretary, 
as well as Bob Hawke and Harold Souter as members.
In light of this it will be useful and indeed neces­
sary to tum to the experience of West Germany, 
which is the model for these plans.
At first, as seen through the eyes of British ortho­
dox economists. Management Today, a big business 
magazine published by the British Institute of Mana­
gement, The Financial Times and The Economist, 
had this to say in its January 1971 issue, which is 
devoted to the West German economy:
“The (pound sterling) 1700 million Bank fur Ge- 
meinwirtschaft, fourth largest commercial bank in 
Germany ... is wholly owned by the German trade
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unions. It makes neither a secret of its ownership, 
nor has it any shame over wearing a strictly capita­
list hat, striving after the same rewards as any other 
major bank ...
“As a result its achievement in banking terms is 
good. If its achievements in social terms appear 
modest, that too is for good and sufficient econo­
mic reasons.”
In an article under the heading “The Bank that 
Unions Built” Tom Lester writes: “Critics may ar­
gue that the Bank fur Gemeinwirtschaft’s philosophy, 
however admirable in itself, will be no more effective 
in promoting the common good than the cooperative 
movement in this country (Britain): in practical terms, 
Marks and Spencer, for all its pure capitalism, has pro­
bably done more for the man-in-the-street than any 
dividend- or profit-sharing scheme could ever do... ”
“The unions do not, Hesselbach (the bank’s General 
Manager) stresses, influence the day-to-day decisions 
made by bank executives according to commercial in­
terests. In theory if a strike hit a client firm, the bank 
would lend the client money to help it over a cash 
crisis; but would also lend money to the strikers to 
help them with hire purchase instalments. That is 
the essence of compromise.” Perhaps -  but it also 
keeps the hire purchase companies solvent.
“Many of the B.f.G. executives are indeed card- 
carrying Social-Democratic Party members as well 
as unionists ... while extremists from either Left 
or Right wings would be excluded.” “The bank 
makes no political distinction in granting credit 
... All parties and churches receive equal treatment, 
but the exception is made of extremists, Left or 
Right...”
“That the Bank fur Gemeinwirtschaft is free to 
act in these capitalist ways is its saving grace -  it 
has no inhibitions about making profits where they 
are appropriate and in Hesselbach’s philosophy they 
provide a stimulus which serves the general good.
In this respect, it is very lucky that the German 
unions are willing to stay right out of the day-to- 
day running of the B.f.G..... Bank executives em­
phasise that the unions have never attempted to 
influence the granting of credit -  to do so, it is 
felt, would destroy the bank’s credibility. ‘We are 
a bank dealing with money, not ideology,’ says 
personnel manager Frau Radke, herself an active 
trade unionist.”
All this is a foreign big business view. Let us look 
at the views of the German leaders involved in these 
enterprises. For unlike here in Australia, they have 
spelled out quite clearly the concepts, the theoreti­
cal premises that guide the German trade union 
movement in their business enteprises. They are 
put forward by a trade union leadership that is 
openly committed to the preservation of the capi­
talist private enterprise system, but seeks to miti­
gate some of its more glaring evils. It is a philoso­
phy that accepts the consumer society and its va­
lues without question. It only seeks to improve it.
Dr. Hesselbach in a talk in 1970 (published in a 
booklet called Commonweal Enterprise [meaning 
public and cooperative enterprise]) states: “We 
must emphasise the fact that the commercial type 
of enterprise is completely justified. However, this 
latter type of enterprise ought to lose its mono­
poly. According to our ideas commonweal enter­
prises should appear in all markets. The competi­
tion between real entrepreneurial efforts can only 
function satisfactorily, in a social and operative 
way, if there are different competing types of en­
terprises with different roles of behavior, alongside 
the competition between private entrepreneurs,” 
and “ ... commonweal enterprise will be able to 
compete with private enterprise under conditions 
of free competition.”
Certainly, German capitalism, big business and 
monopoly has not been weakened at all as a re­
sult of this type of enteprise. Nor has it opposed 
it. West German strike figures are the lowest in 
advanced Western countries.
No wonder that West German big business papers 
evaluate the Australian efforts to enter this field 
positively.
Hesselbach, after dealing with the attitudes of 
the old-style producers’ society, “who thought 
that its deadly enemy was the private industrial 
capitalist entrepreneur,” contrasts this with the 
attitude of the copimonweal enterprises.
“They do not encounter any concrete adversary, 
no class or group which they would like to eliminate. 
They are no longer aiming at being the only victor 
in the end, on the battlefield, they only tackle con­
crete public grievances, working in general in such 
a way as to regulate prices, and they do not do this 
in order to deprive somebody of profits, but chiefly 
only in order to keep the wheels of price competition 
going which are an instrument of planning par excell­
ence. On the other hand, they are quite ready to 
join coalition with private enterprise, from time to 
time, whenever necessary... They do no longer think 
of themselves as adversaries of the market economy, 
on the contrary they are its most active partisans” 
(emphasis added -- B.T.)
“Nowadays, the German Workers’ Movement does 
not demand that the State protect them against ex­
ploiters or under-cutting. Instead the German Trade 
Unions have proposed to take the necessary steps in 
order to defend the existing market order and to im­
prove upon it.”
This attitude of the official West German trade
union movement reflects a situation where the ex­
tensive trade union enterprises have inevitably be­
come integrated into the highly developed West 
German monopoly capitalist economic structure.
For all practical purposes these enterprises have 
become indistinguishable from other capitalist en­
terprises, with at best only marginal benefits, in­
cluding jobs for trade union officials. On the nega­
tive side they have a strong integrative effect. The 
scale of the investment of funds involved gives the 
West German trade union movement a considerable 
stake in the system.
It has also adapted the trade union movement more 
strongly to consumerism, and the values generated 
by it. Large-scale trade union involvement in busi­
ness ventures would have the same effect in Austra­
lia. It is interesting that the real debates in the West 
German trade union and working class movement 
today are not about these enterprises -- they are 
about co-determination or participation (Mitbesti- 
mmung). The trade union enteprises have become 
irrelevant as part of a socialist strategy. It is almost 
taken as natural that the trade union-owned bank 
lends money to Krupp, acting in the same way as any 
other commercial enterprise. As a result, capitalism 
is under less challenge in West Germany today than 
it might be.
In any case, it is very doubtful whether the condi­
tions which made the large trade union enterprises 
possible in the Federal Republic of Germany apply to 
Australia. Germany had a tradition of trade union 
enterprises going back over 100 years. Moreover in 
the post-war situation after 1945, with the need for 
large-scale reconstruction, the union enterprises got 
in on the ground floor. They also had large surplus 
funds to invest. None of these conditions applies 
here. We already have a developed capitalist econo­
my. In fact, it would take a considerable diversion 
of trade union efforts and energies to create the 
basis for any significant trade union involvement in 
economic ventures.
The conditions in Israel are still less applicable to us. 
The Histadruth (the Israeli equivalent of the ACTU) 
play a very significant part as a collective employer. 
But this arose in specific historical conditions, and 
certainly preceded large-scale private capital invest­
ment. In any case, it acts as a bureaucracy based on 
the commercial principles of the existing capitalist 
economy. It certainly is no threat to the capitalist 
system and as in West Germany reinforces consumer­
ism.
For these reasons, it is very doubtful whether these 
efforts can succeed in Australia today. But the more 
serious question is whether the Australian trade union 
movement should direct its energies and efforts in 
this direction, or in another direction.
The struggle against the re-sale price maintenance 
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had a positive effect. Bob Hawke, who came out 
strongly against the monopoly practices of big business 
business, struck a chord in most people’s hearts. His 
victory over the Dunlop Company was seen by many 
people as the trade union standing up successfully to 
,big business, and was applauded.
Nevertheless, what has been its long-term effect?
The profits of the big retailers have not declined, 
despite the period of some economic decline in the 
country. In fact, Bourke’s Store seems to be facing 
some problems. It is complaining that some unions 
and unionists are not giving their support to Bourke’s.
It asks unions to suppress advertising material from 
other firms and offers 21/2% to unions on all purchases 
of its members who participate in this promotion 
scheme (as well as an extra 1% to the parent body,
THC or ACSPA).
Big business has great powers of adaptation and a 
absorption. The big stores and manufacturers find 
new ways of getting over or recouping concessions 
they have been forced to make. It does not neces­
sarily cut into their profits.
It is an illusion that this is the way to challenge 
capitalism. There can be no objection to unions 
running their own establishment or organisation to 
serve their members, such as research organisations, 
printeries, legal departments, even medical research 
into industrial diseases, credit unions, etc. The cru­
cial question is whether these things are subsidiary, 
enabling unions to do their MAIN job better, or 
whether they become the MAIN preoccupation of 
trade unions, diverting them from their more signi­
ficant objectives.
In our view trade union strategy should focus on 
widening the horizons of the workers and involv­
ing the workers directly in the great social struggles
-  it should show them that the system itself needs 
to be challenged, and how to do this in practice.
This involves active struggle against bureaucracy, 
against'integrative trends, against the ethos of the 
consumer society, which trade unions have tradi­
tionally gone along with.
It means raising demands which are concerned 
with control, which challenge established “sacred” 
property rights, and help to overcome deeply in­
grained prejudices and capitalist-fostered values 
in the ranks of the working class.
Demands for workers’ control, for a decisive say 
in all the things which affect the worker’s life -- 
his surroundings, his children’s education and 
health, the destruction of the environment -- 
need the active encouragement of the trade 
union movement if it is to act as an instrument 
for a real and lasting protection of the worker’s 
living standards and conditions and his eventual 
liberation from his oppressed condition.
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EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY
Dean Ashenden
(This article is the text o f a paper given at the seminar DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION conducted by the South 
Australian Institute o f Teachers in Adelaide in September this year. Mr. Ashenden was debating the topic “How 
Democratic is South Australian Education? ” with Mr. K.E. Barter, Director o f Secondary Education, South Aust­
ralian Education Department.
I have often been a critic of Australian education, and 
my criticism has usually been severe. I suppose, then, 
that I’m the sort of person Mr. Barter referred to when 
he addressed a student meeting at Adelaide University 
on May 16 this year. He said:
It is all too common these days to hear public 
spokesmen voice the opinion, with a lack of 
close knowledge, but with a confidence usually 
reserved for certainty, that Australian educat­
ion .......... is poor and even worse. (1)
By the time I read this remark, reprinted in the 
Education Gazette, I was well into the preparation of 
this paper, and so I decided that, common or not, an­
other piece of such criticism would have to be inflicted 
on a helpless public. When I read the next sentence, 
though, I was ready to give up the attempt, for Mr. Bar­
ter went on to tell his audience that he was able to 
deny that Australian education was poor or even worse 
and, he continued, that he could:
add emphasis from my close knowledge of 
what is happening in South Australia by 
saying that such criticism is rubbish. (2)
At this stage, I realised that there was no point in going 
on. I rang Murray Haines, told him the Institute had
1. K.E. Barter, “The Aims and Achievements of the 
South Australian Education Department in Sec­
ondary Education”, Education Gazette, SA Educ­
ation Department, July 1972 (a special supplem­
ent), p .l .
The Gazette is the official publication of the Ed­
ucation Department, and the appearance in it o f 
Mr. Barter’s statement suggests that he was enun­
ciating an official line in response to left and pro­
gressive criticism of the Department.
2. loc. cit.
backed the wrong horse, Brin Munro (3) was right after 
all, and he’d better scrub the conference. Murray point­
ed out that this would leave the Blue Moon catering 
service with hundreds of unwanted cocktail frankfurts, 
that dozens of teachers would lose their day off, and 
what with one thing and another, I’d better press on 
regardless. Here, then, is your reluctant critic.
The topic of the debate is How Democratic is South 
Australian Education?, and the usual thing is to de­
fine your terms.
The first part is the most difficult, and so I’m happy 
to subscribe to the idea of democracy which Brian 
Abbey stated or implied in his paper this morning.
The part of the topic that does need clarification is 
‘education’.
I want to separate the process of education from the 
institutions of schooling. Tftis is not to say that the 
two are entirely separate, for it is notorious that educ­
ation often occurs in the schooling system. It is less 
often realised that education, of a kind, also happens 
outside the formal school situation. Sometimes this 
is a fairly obvious process -  radio, newspapers, TV 
and the like influence the way people understand the 
world and themselves, and whatever one might think 
of the consequences it is, in its way, education. People 
are also affected by their everyday experience, they 
learn from it, are educated by it. These sorts of educ­
ation lie, I think, outisde the terms of this debate, 
but I think it important, before I get onto the school­
ing system, to point out that whilst this sort of in-
3. Murray Haines is current President of the South 
Australian Institute o f Teachers, and Convenor 
of the Democracy in Education seminar; Brian 
Munro is a leading DLP activist in SA education, 
and was foremost in an attack mounted against 
Haines and the Institute for allowing itself to  
become the instrument of the subversive left, etc.
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formal education is pretty universal, it is in consequence 
undemocratic. The media confirm the addictions of 
passive consumers and serve to protect them from 
ideas or information which would lead to a question­
ing of their society’s order. The media’s more crucial 
function is to confirm the lessons of experience in 
society -- that the ‘average man’ cannot expect to 
create, decide or influence, but must labour, accept, 
and be swayed. This diffuse, informal education is 
so thorough-going that the ‘average man’ will be 
unlikely to conceive of man as a creative being cap­
able of choice; to suggest that he could be, flies so 
flatly in the face of experience as to seem to him to 
be pie in the sky. Such are the results of informal 
learning. Is formal schooling different?
The schooling system in South Australia has three 
main components. There is the infant, primary and 
secondary sector, with its subdivisions of state and 
private schools. There is the tertiary system, includ­
ing universities, teachers’ colleges, colleges of advan­
ced education, and various trade and specialist inst­
itutions. And thirdly, there is a variety of other 
institutions, including pre-schools, adult education, 
the university radio, and the like. We can describe 
this complicated set of institutions by asking six 
questions about them:
1. Who gets into them?
2. What processes go on in the system?
3. What happens to the schooled as a 
consequence of their schooling?
4. Who manages the system as a whole?
5. Who manages the components of 
the system (e.g. a primary school)?
6. In whose interest does this system 
operate?
Questions 2 and 5 are the concern of the next two 
sessions of the conference, and I’ll steer clear of 
them. (4) I will try to answer the four questions, 
which, to repeat, are:
1. Who gets into the schooling system?
2. What happens to them as a consequence?
3. Who controls the system as a whole?
4. The management o f schools was dealt with on 
Saturday morning by Bill Hannan, Gerry Tickell 
(each from Melbourne) and Michael Gilding (an 
Adelaide matriculation student); the social pro­
cesses of school life were discussed on Saturday 
afternoon by Doug White (Melbourne), Rodney 
Allen (an Adelaide philosopher) and Mary Kob- 
isneiewski (an Adelaide parent).
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4. In whose interests does the schooling 
system operate?
Most people concerned with education would say 
that everybody gets into the schooling system. This 
belief is summed up in the slogan of ‘equality of 
opportunity’. Thus, the Karmel Report:
The schools provided by the state therefore 
attempt to provide the means to realise 
equality of opportunity between children 
from every kind of home (5)
This seems to approximate reality, for it seems ob­
vious that everyone has a more or less fair go at what 
the schooling system offers. In fact, if we can imagine 
South Australian society sliced down the middle, and 
hold it up for inspection, things look different.
If we look firstly at the ten year old layer, we can 
see that all, or nearly all, the ten year olds are to be 
found in the schooling system. But quite aside from 
the undemocratic processes of school life (a descrip­
tive task belonging to tomorrow’s sessions), the arr­
angements of groups of ten year olds is markedly 
unequal. Small numbers of them are comfortably 
closeted in private schools, usually because their 
parents belong to an elite or, on occasions, because 
they want their sons and daughters to join one. We 
can also see inequalities which come from class or 
race or ethnic group, and to some extent, from where 
the ten year old lives (itself a consequence of class 
or ethnic group). But at this point in his life, the 
ten year olds share a relatively equal life-situation in 
the school, and this is one of the few bouquets one 
can accord Australia’s centralised education system. 
Lest Mr. Barter thinks I’ve decided to stop talking 
rubbish and start talking sense, I’d remind him that 
whilst the shared experience of these ten year olds 
is equal, it is equally unpleasant and undemocratic.
If we now look at the twenty year olds in South 
Australia today, a very different picture emerges.
The life-situations of the twenty year olds vary en­
ormously. Firstly, we can now see that the ten inter­
vening years have taken their toll, and very few remain 
inside the schooling system. There are approximately 
26,000 ten year olds in the schooling system today; 
there are approximately 5,000 twenty year olds.
Even allowing for population structure, it is safe to 
say that, at best, only one in four will survive the 
schooling system to their twentieth year.
If we inspect them closely, we find that the notion of 
equality of opportunity has long since been abandoned. 
In the first place, these people are there because their 
parents are higher up the scales of salary, status, school-
5. Education in South Australia: Report of the 
Committee of Enquiry into Education in South 
Australia 1969-1970. Adelaide 1971. (Prof.P.H. 
Karmel was Chairman of this Committee).
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ing success, and class; they may also owe their life- 
circumstances to their race, or ethnic group, or their 
sex. Further, their actual place within the system will 
be strongly influenced by the same variables. As we climb 
up the schooling ladder from trade school to technical 
school to teachers’ college, college of advanced education 
to university (and within the university from arts up to 
medicine), we will find more and more Australian, middle 
class, eastern suburbs males, and less and less migrants, 
workers, females, or residents of Bowden. The schooling 
system, in short, has not merely failed to counteract the 
inequalities of the society which surrounds it, but is 
serving to reinforce those inequalities. The defender of 
the system will, at this point, want to say that I’ve for­
gotten the most significant index of all ~ namely intell­
igence, ability. These twenty year olds, the argument 
runs, are where they are because they deserve to be 
there. This argument seems to me to ignore two crucial 
considerations. Firstly, success in schooling is probably 
less dependent on such intellectual ability than it is 
on the ability to conform, to perform routine tasks to 
survive schooling. (6)
Secondly, the argument implies that individuals 
should be put into a highly competitive system and 
given fat rewards for being good at what the system 
demands. Neither competition nor discrimination, 
however, help to make democratic man. The twenty 
year olds still in the schooling system have access to 
a disproportionate share of social resources, and will, 
because of it, be able to get their hands on a whole 
lot more before they’re through. I will defer, for the 
moment, saying why it happens that way.
Thirdly, and briefly, we can look at the thirty year 
olds. A few of them are still in the schooling system, 
for varying periods of time. They take post-graduate 
courses, attend re-training schools, or come to confer­
ences. They are almost entirely members of an elite.
By any calculation, they have succeeded in cornering 
most of what this society offers in the way of a 
chance to make decisions, realise self and to influence 
others. Any equitable use of social resources would 
be at least wanting to compensate the losers for the 
lack of any of these in their life experience, but in 
fact they get nothing, and those who already have 
more get more. Here again, another small bouquet 
is due to the WEA, Adult Education, district librar­
ies and the like. Their size and resources are an accur­
ate reflection, however, of the forces which determine 
the allocation of resources.
I have already gone some way, then, to tackling my 
second question -- what happens as a consequence of 
experience in the schooling system? In brief, two unde­
mocratic things happen. Firstly, the schooling system
6. On this point, see an excellent article by Herbert 
Giutis ‘Towards a Political Economy o f Educat­
ion: a Radical Critique of Ivan Illich’s ‘De­
schooling Society’. Harvard Educational Review,
42, 1, Feb. 1972, pp. 70-96.
partly confirms, partly determines the distribution of 
wealth, of self-esteem, of chances for self-realisation, 
of power. Secondly, it places power in the hands of 
people who have not only had long experience of a 
highly competitive, hierarchical and undemocratic 
social system, but have been very good at surviving 
it, and are therefore likely to identify themselves with 
it, to see the world in its terms. That is, the schooling 
system has served to perpetuate undemocratic social 
arrangements -- and has in the process generated an 
ideology which so shapes and selects views of those 
arrangements as to make them appear the reverse o f 
what they are; at least I assume that’s why Mr.Barter, 
in the talk already quoted, said that: “Without com­
placency we can be proud of our system.” (7)
The two most difficult questions remain: who con­
trols the schooling system, and in whose interest?
Who controls the system?I don’t think anyone 
would want to deny that the schooling system is at 
least partly controlled by its bureaucracies. Each 
school has its internal bureaucracy, and in the case 
of the State schools, its point of connection with the 
bureaucracy beyond is the headmaster. The head­
master’s function within the school is not really my 
province in this paper. I wish it were, because Mr. A.W. 
Jones has been helpfully candid about that matter. 
“Let me say at the outset,” he says in his well-known 
memo Freedom and Authority, “ that you as Head of 
your school, by delegated authority from the Minister 
and the Director-General, are in undisputed control 
of your school.” (8)
This same remark also suggests where control goes 
from there. It belongs to a large and complex bureau­
cracy which is made up of people, almost invariably 
middle-aged males, who have been successful in the 
political environment within the school and in the 
conduct of relations between that school and the bu­
reaucracy. This mechanism of recruitment ensures the 
continuity of a strict definition of role and function,
7. Barter, op. cit. p. 1.
8. As quoted in ibid. This is, in my view, the heart 
of this notorious memorandum. Many readers 
will remember Mr. Jones bruiting it about on 
the ABC’s Great Debate, in a sales line already 
familiar to South Australians, as a progressive 
democratic document. In fact, it opens the way 
for a despotism which is all the more pernicious 
because it is on site, not away in Flinders St.;
it also exploits the popular confusion in teach­
ers’ minds about the real role o f the headmaster 
and by projecting him as a staff-member-cum- 
embodiment-of ‘the school’, it divides teachers’ 
loyalties; thus, when previously teachers were 
almost unanimous in their opposition to Flind­
ers St., they are now often unable to oppose 
administrative dominance of education because 
it is carried out by the headmaster, a role not 
so clear in their minds as that o f a ‘Flinders 
St. bureaucrat’. The same memorandum uses 
the same strategy in its promotion of SRC’s, 
school councils, etc.
of conduct regulated by finely-detailed rules, instruc­
tions and regulations which accrete like coral. It en­
sures a strong emphasis on continuity, and where 
change occurs, it must be change which can be acc­
ommodated by the structure and its personnel -- 
often the changes are not merely accommodated, 
but are co-opted to reinforce the system. Student 
reps, school councils, staff meetings and so forth 
are just such changes.
We must also remember that those who are in the bu­
reaucracy have been attracted into it -  after all, no-one 
made them go there, and the attraction is the apparent 
potential for decision-making, for influencing people, 
for exercising power. Those who have joined the bu­
reaucracy soon become aware that such opportunities 
are relatively greater as one rises up the internal ladder.
A very few realise, to their dismay, that bureaucracies 
have very often been too successful in making their 
operations routine, reliable, defined and regulated; that 
matters for decision are so selected and so defined that 
the real choices available to an individual are relatively 
small in size and number. One has only to hear Hugh 
Hudson (9) bemoan the tiny amounts of money avail­
able to him for “discretionary spending” to realise that 
if things are so crook for thje whales, it must be posit­
ively crummy for the minnows. And when one remem­
bers that there is a high degree of identity of views and 
dispositions amongst these individuals, it is scarcely sur­
prising that there are few surprises.
The characteristics of this system will percolate down­
wards. This is partly because those in the bureaucracy 
control entry into their own ranks, and its members will 
approve of those who embody their own best qualities - 
regularity, predictability, commitment to system stability, 
competitiveness, and a willingness to acquire and use 
power. In this way, people in the schools are encouraged 
to take on these qualities. The process of downwards 
percolation is further assisted by the willingness of bur­
eaucrats to define the site, nature, and, they hope, con­
sequences, of the operations under their control. Thus,
Mr. Barter in the address already quoted:
The Education Department sets the broad 
policy aims, gives advice, and sets up training 
schemes on ways to achieve such aims. It 
appoints skilled advisers in curriculum and 
teaching methods in the form of inspectors 
and consultants who visit the schools. (10)
Further, the bureaucracy reserves for itself the right to 
regulate, weigh-up, and adjudicate between various com­
peting “interest groups” . Mr. Barter again:
working rules are adopted as policy by the 
Education Department, taking into account
9. The Labor Government’s Minister for 
Education.
10. K.E. Barter, op. cit. p .l.
opinions, points of view and needs of the 
various parts of the community, including 
teachers, teacher organisations, universities 
and other tertiary bodies, parents and parent 
organisations, employers advisory boards 
and committees and by the students them­
selves. (11)
Note the assumption that the view from the adminis­
trator’s box is not only better than that of others, but 
is in fact so uniquely clear that the administrator alone 
is in a position to make the large, the “broad policy” 
decisions. That is why Mr. Barter was telling the student 
whether or not the education system was poor -- he 
should have been asking them.
One more example of the percolation process will suff­
ice. The Director-General’s memorandum already ref­
erred to tells the head that he should extend prerogat­
ives to his staff just as he (the Director-General) is ex­
tending prerogatives to heads. The head is, of course, 
free to construe this as he likes. As for the parents, the 
memo says that things should be done “with their full 
knowledge” . It also adds that “student opinion should 
make itself known” . (12)
Thus the bureaucratic values of clearly delineated 
individual responsibility and power, paternalism and 
noblesse oblige, and the notion that olympian neutral­
ity can be combined with individual power find their 
way into the school. Thus the great majority must con­
sent or resist ~ a resistance loaded with all the risks 
involved in crossing a more or less benevolent despot­
ism.
I have gone into the disposition of power within the 
Education Department in a little detail because it is 
the largest schooling bureaucracy. I think that the 
same general description could be applied to the small­
er bureaucracies which manage the universities, the 
private schools and so on. Without going into that 
assertion, the point of interest now becomes the 
place where these numerous power structures merge 
into the over-arching structure. Obviously, the Educ­
ation Department is very directly coupled to the State 
Minister; increasingly, but less obviously, private 
schools, universities and the rest are, in varying deg­
rees, also influenced by him as the keeper of the purse 
or, more accurately, assistant keeper of part of the 
purse, for beyond the Minister is the Federal Gov­
ernment and its bevy of commissions and boards 
which regulate the flow of cash. This cash sometimes 
goes through the State Minister, and sometimes 
directly into universities and colleges of advanced 
education and schools.
This disposition of resources is interesting in two 
ways. Firstly, its amount determines the extent of 
the schooling system, and thus its place in the social
11. loc. cit. Note who comes last.
12. Jones, quoted in ibid., p. 2.
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system as a whole. Secondly, it is often parcelled out 
in specified directions or under specific conditions, 
and thus the priorities of the federal administration 
are directly reflected in the shape of the schooling 
system. The shape and functioning of this system is 
extremely complex, and rather than try to describe 
it more carefully, I refer you to Doug White’s excellent 
chapter in Kirsner and Playford. (13)
For my purpose, the actual operation of these mech­
anisms is less important than the imperatives which de­
termine its functioning. That is, these structures certain­
ly do have an independent influence on the systems 
they service, but more fundamental and crucial are the 
forces which shape their distribution of resources.
Thus we come to the fourth question. In whose int­
erest does the schooling system operate?
Much of my paper has implied that the kind and 
amount of schooling made available to people varies 
with their class, race, sex and language group, and whilst 
this is clearly so, the most powerful single factor from 
the beginning of the secondary schooling on is, however, 
the potential productivity of that person. That is, money 
and resources will only be available to an individual in 
the form of schooling insofar as there will be a greater 
return than there was expenditure on him. The usual 
phrase here is “ investment in manpower” .
Like any other investment its purpose is to ensure 
the stability of the productive system and to increase 
production and profit. I am claiming, then, that the 
purpose of schooling in our society is overwhelmingly 
dominated by the needs of the economic system. Per­
haps I can best make this clear by contrasting this ver­
sion of the purposes of schooling with a more common 
version.
Thus, my own institution, Bedford Park Teachers’ 
College, states the purposes of a “liberal education” as 
they particularly apply to a teachers college, but I think 
you’ll find that the words have a familiar ring:
Pervading all our efforts.....is the ideal of a
liberal education. By this I mean that education 
which endeavours to free the individual from 
the limitations of ignorance, prejudice, and 
provincialism and prepares him to seek the 
truth in all fields of human thought and 
endeavour through the use of reason. It is 
the education which enables him to make 
wise decisions independently, discriminate 
between truth and falsehood, the worthwhile 
and the trivial. It is, echoing the view of the 
Athenians, the education of free men and 
women -  free in the sense of having knowledge 
and mastery of the selves as well as their 
environment. (14)
This seems to me to be very far from describing what 
are, in fact, the functions of the schooling system, or 
even the small part the teachers’ colleges play in it. 
Oddly enough, a more realistic summary is available 
in the Karmel Report, even though we may have to 
translate a few terms. Thus, the report says:
From the point of view of society the 
steady march of technological progress 
is dependent on an increasing flow of 
highly educated persons in the field of 
technology, economics, business admin­
istration, psychology, education and so 
on. (15)
The key terms here are society, progress and educat­
ed. They are misleading terms. In fact, the word 
“society” refers to that part of social activity which 
leads to production, and is much better termed the 
economic system. The word “progress” is loaded with 
favourable connotations, and a more objective des­
cription is “production” . The term “education” con­
jures up the world of the handbook when, in fact, 
what is referred to is the acquisition of highly spec­
ific skills, a process better known as “training” . We 
can now get close to the truth by offering a trans­
lation which reads:
From the point of view of the economic 
system the steady march of technological 
production is dependent on an increasing 
flow of highly trained persons in the 
fields of technology, economics, business 
administration, psychology, education and 
so on.
Surprisingly, the Karmel Report also comes close to 
making clear the crucial role of the schooling system 
in all this - namely, the weeding out of unprofitable 
investments, and the transmutation of people into 
personnel. Thus the report says:
The individual, by equipping himself 
(note the equal opportunity ideology 
here) with sophisticated skills, raises 
his earning power relative to others 
and fits himself for a high level of 
employment. Indeed it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to obtain resp­
onsible and interesting jobs without 
a tertiary education. (16)
Now I want to remind you that three-quarters of the 
population of this democracy of ours are pushed out 
of the schooling system before they get to any kind
14. Bedford Park Teachers’ College Student 
Handbook, 1970, p.9 (from the Foreword 
by the Principal).
15. Karmel, op. cit., p. 287.
16. loc. cit.
13. Kirsner and Playford (eds.) ‘Australian Capit­
alism, Melb., 1972.
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of tertiary schooling at all. The full impact of that can 
be gleaned by inverting that last quote from the Karm- 
el Report:
The individual, by failing to equip himself 
with sophisticated skills, lowers his earning 
power relative to others and fits himself 
for low level employment. Indeed it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to get any­
thing but irresponsible and boring jobs 
without a tertiary education.
On the face of it, then, clearly only a quarter or less, 
of the population stand to gain whilst the schooling 
system performs its present functions. I think that 
it’s worse than that, however. The economic system, 
for which schooling provides such crucial services, is 
rigged even more thoroughly than the schooling sys­
tem itself. In the first place, don’t forget that all 
these expensively schooled people go on to make 
money for their employers, but are provided to the 
employers at public cost. Just as roads, railways and 
the like are run at public expense for private profit, 
so, too, is the schooling system.
This singular fact points to the role of the modem 
state in servicing the needs of capitalist economies. 
What’s more, I don’t think it needs a detailed state­
ment on my part to demonstrate that capitalism is 
not oriented to social goals such as democracy. Prof. 
Frymier, the keynote speaker of this seminar, put it 
quite succinctly when he said approvingly of US 
capitalism:
The basic purpose of the economic 
enterprise as we know in this country 
(and we know about capitalism in 
this country, too, Professor Frymier) 
is to make money: to show profit.
Unless the individual or organisation 
engaged in economic activity can 
show financial gain, the basic object­
ive has not been realised. (17)
That basic purpose demands social arrangements which 
are the converse of democracy. It demands that people 
be competitive, not co-operative; it demands that their 
success in a lifelong competiton be measured in mater-
17. Jack R. Frymier.
This remark is made as part of an amazing 
thesis - that if US education could only be 
made to more closely imitate the US econ­
omic and political systems, it would at last 
be on the right track.
ial terms; it demands that there be many, many more 
losers than winners; it demands that people be organ­
ised in such a way as to make them productive, and 
this demands that they behave in highly routine, pred­
ictable and uniform ways. It requires that social and 
financial resources be spent upon people only insofar 
as that expenditure will make them more productive. 
Thus, the men who wrote the Karmel Report are not 
villains; they are merely the sophisticated interpret­
ers of the imperatives of a system of production whose 
aim is to make more profit from more production. 
They are ideally suited to the task because they have 
so absorbed the imperatives of the system as to 
scarcely notice when they are describing them. Let 
me quote from them once more:
Many large employers recognise the 
advantages of recruiting employees 
who have completed their basic tertiary 
education: these employees are more 
adaptable, are ready for specialised in- 
service training, and can devote their 
efforts more wholeheartedly to the 
interests of their employers. (18)
It’s the kind of thing you’d expect to find on the 
secret files of the Chamber of Commerce!
What conclusions can we draw from this? The school­
ing system is highly competitive and selective; its succ­
esses are those who learn to be good at its competitive­
ness, accept its essentially bureaucratic characteristics 
of order, efficiency, routine; who can submerge the 
self and not mind the concentration of real power; 
they are those who really desire its rewards. It goes 
without saying that these essential characteristics are 
the reverse of democratic. It is urgent that teachers 
and students realise that it is no accident that their 
life-experience in the schooling system is as it is.
The schooling system does not merely imitate many 
of the qualities of the system outside it, but it is 
so because the system of which it is an integral part 
requires that it be so. On the face of it then, any 
attempt to bring democracy into the schooling sys­
tem must wait on the end of capitalism. It is certain 
that this is in large measure true. It remains, however, 
the urgent task of socialists in schooling to lighten 
the weight on the inmates of the system by striving 
to make experience there creative, critical and chosen, 
for these are the qualities of education, not schooling, 
just as they are the purposes of socialism, not capit­
alism. Such an attempt will be part of the achievement 
of a socialist and democratic society.
18. Karmel, op. cit., p. 285.
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IS THE COUNTER CULTURE 
REVOLUTIONARY? 
Russel Edwards
There seems to be some confusion amongst marx- 
ists in Australia as to how to regard the emergence 
in the late ’sixties and early ’seventies of a substant­
ial group of disillusioned young people, intent on ex­
ploring non-materialist life styles. Reactions to the 
counter-culture have ranged from uncritical enthu­
siasm to outright contempt. Lyn Donaldson (ALR, 
No. 35) is certainly correct in her view that bour­
geois society can tolerate the counter-culture, and 
absorb it into its own ethos. She then states, how­
ever, that:
“ ... despite antagonistic polemics between the 
culturo-revolutionaries and the political-revolution- 
aries, it is inevitable that their coalition will provide 
a triumphant assault on capitalist bourgeois society.”
Well, maybe, but maybe not. I have been involved 
in the counter-culture for several years, and over 
that time developed some major doubts as to its 
revolutionary potential.
We have made so many mistakes, the artificial 
divorce of culture from politics being only one of 
them. In doing so we followed Leary up a blind 
alley, right into an exiled hole in Algeria. We created 
a grotesque caricature of straight society, little Wah- 
roongas in Balmain or Glebe. A dope market which 
is an exact sickening replica of Wall Street. We en­
abled the hippie-capitalist to rationalise his beha­
vior -  rip-off your friends for fun and profit, es­
pecially profit. We engaged in pretentious ego 
tussles and called them consciousness-raising. We 
justified structured and hierarchical movements -  
and the voice of the “anarachists” became more 
frenziedly fascist. Pretence became more important 
than content, and as Richard Neville laments, the 
advertising campaign was a resounding success, but 
there was nothing inside the wrapping paper. We 
sought happiness within unhappiness, consolation 
within the status quo. But the source of that un­
happiness, the capitalist State, did not change.
One of the most consistent themes of the counter­
culture is that the great bulk of the population are 
shits (anyone who disagrees is a super-shit). They
are all “sold-out, screwed-up, mindless materialists, 
grey-flannel skinheads.” The concept os a bourgeois 
consensus society stems from Marcuse. But before 
him, curiously enough, this theory was developed 
by American sociologists who are considered to be 
ultra-conservative. Writers like Seymour Martin Lip- 
set and Talcott Parsons optimistically and compla­
cently asserted that all the conflicting forces in so­
ciety had been smoothed out and the whole struc­
ture was functioning because of an almost universal 
acceptance of common values. Herbert Marcuse ar­
gued that this consensus was a symptom of moral 
and political decay. In One Dimensional Man he 
argued that this condition had been brought about 
by the use to which technology was being put in 
capitalist society. Capitalism, he correctly perceives, 
must expand in order to survive, and this growth is 
ensured if, among other things,the level of consum­
ption is pushed higher and higher within existing 
incomes (and the consumer “durables” have built- 
in obsolescence). Marcuse emphasises strongly the 
power of a technological society to manipulate and 
mould the whole life-style and aspirations of man­
kind in its own image, and in accordance with its 
own objective requirements.
Counter-culture sophists have certainly accepted 
this thesis uncritically. Moreover, in its popularised 
form, it is usually argued that this bourgeois, consen­
sus has been produced by the “conditioning” powers 
of the media, and that consumption is stimulated by 
“psychic manipulation.” Certainly advertisers use 
psychological gimmickry, but it is not so much this 
as the objective social reality which surrounds ad­
vertising that determines consumption patterns. 
Could anyone deny that in this age of inadequate 
public transport and rapacious landlords with poor 
quality houses to offer, a car and a home are desir­
able things to own? More specifically, while many 
advertisers stress male dominance as a selling point, 
the ideology of male supremacy originated in the 
property relations of the economy. The media re­
flects this ideology, and in turn reinforces it, but 
does not determine it. As capitalism has expanded, 
and the division of labor and mechanisation has in­
creased, more and more workers are required for 
tertiary activities. Hence the ideology of male sup-
remacy is becoming obsolete, as illustrated by the 
acceptance of the women’s liberation movement.
No amount of “psychic manipulation” can change 
this process. Thus, consumer capitalism was a log­
ical extension of a culture which already stressed 
aggrandisement by property, although obviously 
abetted by the media.
Although never acknowledged, the “conditioned 
consumer” theory owes its debt to J.B. Watson,., 
who demonstrated that the human being consisted 
of nothing but a few stripped muscles and some con­
ditioned reflexes. Today Watson musters few defen­
ders for his extreme views, and yet so many young 
rebels believe that if you ring a bell, the consumer 
salivates. This view is popular amongst intellectuals 
as well. As Ellen Willis states, “because it appeals 
to their dislike of capitalism and their feeling of sup­
eriority over the working classes. This elitism is 
evident in their conviction that they have seen 
through the system while the average working 
slob is brainwashed by the media.” (1) No mat­
ter how much fuel the “conditioned bourgeois 
consensus” theory provides for elitist fantasies, 
it is an over-simplification of reality. It denies 
the existence of substantial groups in society 
who live in completely different and often anta­
gonistic ways to that of the middle-class material­
ist ideal propagated by the all-powerful condition­
ing media. Different groups have varying degrees 
of awareness, as one author notes: “Those of us 
who talk to workers of all political lines will know 
if they have tried that when the question of domi­
nation by their property is brought up, you fre­
quently strike an instant response.” (2) Obviously, 
the conditioning process is not as efficient as is 
commonly believed by counter-culture sophists, 
but then affluent youth are far removed from 
working-class social reality. It is easy to forget 
that in May, 1968, workers and revolutionary 
students came close to overthrowing the French 
government. Presumably they were “conditioned” 
not to do that. At what point did the chosen few 
of the counter-culture cast off this conditioning? 
Those who claim that it was LSD, that magical 
substance guaranteed to turn a bourgeois child 
into a revolutionary, are surely putting the cart 
before the horse. And the thesis, common amongst 
students, that it is a matter of intelligence, is cer­
tainly an elitist one.
Intellectual snobbishness has been with us for a 
long time. A decade ago Allan Ashbolt described 
the “proles” as being no more than glutinous mass­
es of second-hand sensations and ad-fed desires, mo­
rons manipulated by faceless organisation men and 
Anderson ratings researchers. That sort of view is 
on par with the one which suggests that all our con­
temporary social problems like drug-use are commu­
nist plots, devised by faceless men in the Kremlin. 
Yet so many, so many of the coffee-table counter­
culture set would agree with Ashbolt, and so it 
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seems does their current menot, Yale professor 
Charles Reich. He writes:
“Look again at a fascist, tight-lipped, tense, crew- 
cut, correctly dressed, church going, ajj American 
flag on his car window, a hostile eye for communists, 
youth and blacks. He has had very little of love, poe­
try, music, nature or joy. He has been dominated by 
fear. He has been condemned to narrow-minded pre­
judice, to self-defending materialism ... he has fled 
all his life from consciousness and responsibility.”
(3) Reich urges his readers to be “ tolerant” and 
“loving” to the blue-collar worker because the poor 
creature hasn’t had an artistic-cultural background.
And this comes from a self-announced agent of a 
superior consciousness, so prepared to dismiss the 
lives of ordinary people as beneath contempt. His 
heart might be in the right place, but this is, as 
Craig McGregor notes, “the authentic voice of the 
aristocrat indignant at the failure of others to be as 
high-brow, as cultivated, as intelligent as himself.”
(4)
And this, too, is the voice of the so-called revolu­
tionary counter-culture. It has grown so far apart 
from the society which spawned it that it cannot 
possibly accurately portray it. To rely on smart 
witticisms and snobbish generalisations is hardly 
a sign of intellectual strength or cultural superior­
ity.
It is important to note that the counter-culture 
is almost entirely made up of the young affluent 
middle class. A study of American students found 
that amongst politically radical groups, and those 
exploring alternative life styles, individuals from 
high-income families were disproportionately re­
presented. Students from blue-collar backgrounds 
were more likely to have adopted the norms and 
aspirations of conventional society. (5) This tends 
to disprove the old cliche of the generation gap.
Since affluence is its base, it is not surprising that 
the counter-culture developed an elitist outlook.
Also it is no accident that this developed at the 
same time as there has been an unprecedented 
number able to avail themselves of tertiary educa­
tion. The position of students involves an invidi­
ous degree of dependence for most. The student 
has a feeling of being in the society, but not of it, 
a feeling which quite accurately reflects the stu­
dent’s relationship to the economy. At the same 
time youthful idealism convinces many that their 
work is futile. So just at that time when assertion 
of independence becomes important, the society 
consigns the student to the role of an object of 
indulgence. (6) Not surprisingly, a significant pro­
portion of them turn with fine savagery on the 
society responsible, This does not imply maladjust­
ment, a theory much beloved by social scientists, 
but rather that there is something very wrong with 
the society which causes such alienation. Very few 
individuals are able to examine objectively their own 
position in society, or analyse the reasons for the way
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they feel, and radical students are no exception. In­
stead there is just a feeling of helplessness.
But at least most are aware of the exploitative na­
ture of capitalist society, and its outward manifesta- 
ions of imperialism, pollution and poverty. But 
socialism as a means of overcoming these has not be­
come a sustaining ideology for most. Firstly, because 
of the class origin of the radicals themselves -  and, 
secondly, there is widespread acceptance of the thes­
is of convergence between capitalist and socialist 
economies. In fact, crude technological determinism 
is a strong current of thought within the counter­
culture. Technology itself represents a “death-trip.” 
Theodore Roszak, who first coined the phrase “coun­
ter-culture,” has consistently emphasised technology’s 
destructive and dehumanising aspects. While Marcuse 
argued that it was those who owned and controlled 
technology who were responsible for its dehumanis­
ing effects (but in turn this domination was so strong 
that virtually nothing could be done about it), Ros­
zak considers that it is the responsibility of techno­
logy per se. He states: “It is essential to realise that 
the technocracy is not the exclusive product of 
that old devil capitalism. Rather it is the product 
of a mature and accelerating industrialism.” (7)
Roszak sees in the counter-culture a vision of a 
future world at one with nature and mankind’s 
own spirit. He argues that this liberation will oc­
cur not when the means of production have been 
removed from capitalist exploitation, but when 
they have been abandoned. How this will “libe­
rate” the lives of 220 million Americans, let alone 
the population of the rest of the world, Roszak 
never really considers. A few words about Indian 
mysticism and tribal culture is all he includes. Pre­
sumably he has in mind a non-technological socie­
ty, with its high death rates, and stifling dependence 
on primitive means of subsistence. It’s a rather naive 
vision of Utopia -- history has shown what happens 
when a primitive society comes in contact with a 
technolgically advanced one. Roszak’s is the voice 
of the reactionary, like the Luddites of the 19th 
century, who urged the industrial workers to smash 
the machines and return to the idyllic rural past 
(and presumably back to the chains of feudal op­
pression). Nevertheless, this philosophy lies behind 
all the current counter-culture “back to the earth” 
movements.
Not only Roszak, but much of contemporary 
economic and sociological theory is strongly in­
fluenced by technological determinism. Robin 
Blackburn describes this as “bourgeois fatalism” 
whose function has been to “create a morbid 
paralysis of social will, undermining the belief 
that man can ever transform society.” (8) It cer­
tainly seems to have succeeded in doing just that.
The counter-culture has turned its back on techno­
logical society, given it up as beyond redemption. 
Almost fatalistically, in their thousands they flee
the urban monster, expecting to find peace in the 
countryside, and their emigration is met by hundreds 
of thousands of peasants travelling in the opposite 
direction. And as one writer points out:
“ It is almost hypocritical to say at the same time 
that one sympathises with the starving peoples of 
the third world and that one opposes the technology 
which offers the only way out of that starvation.”
(9)
For Marx, human liberation could not be achieved by 
anarchistic acts or by withdrawing into isolated 
communities. Technology itself held the key. In a 
socialist society, in the absence of market forces play­
ing a decisive role, welfare, environmental and social 
considerations can be incorporated into the deci- 
sion-making process of the productive enterprise.
Within a capitalist framework, however, such mat­
ters are described as “externalities,” unable to be 
calculated, and hence ignored. But, the counter­
culture sophists (especially Roszak) charge, the 
notion that resources can be allocated to achieve 
maximum social utility is utopian, and certainly 
doesn’t occur in contemporary socialist countries.
It’s like the “withering away of the State,” it’s 
claimed: no communist party in the socialist world 
has so far shown any signs of declaring itself super­
fluous. According to Roszak and many others, 
technological determinism explains this, and no 
further historical and sociological scholarship is con­
sidered necessary.
Indeed, in Richard Neville’s view, the study of 
historical and social processes is part of the prob­
lem, and not part of the solution. In Playpower 
he describes a discussion group led by Ernest Man- 
del: “ It was obviously a solemn occasion... The 
man in the chair was speaking heavy Marx with a 
German accent... In the discussion which followed, 
tense for those involved, three hours were spent 
arguing over the definition of neo-capitalism.”
Neville comments: “One man’s revolution is another 
man’s purgatory.” (10) I can understand his frustra­
tion, but nevertheless true analysis of society is 
essential if social action is to be effective. In a 
later paper, entitled Counter-Culture Crap, Neville 
laments the failure of the counter-culture revolu­
tion, a fact which surely emphasises this point.
Like the Yippies, Neville believed in smashing the 
capitalist State, and both believed the youth of 
the world would be the revolutionary agency. This 
notion is now well and truly dead. Time magazine’s
polls have indicated that over 50% of the 18-24 
year olds in the US are voting for Nixon...
The whole malaise of counter-culture theory stems 
from this fundamental error. By concentrating on 
youth alone, it has ignored the role of the working 
class as an agency of social change altogether. Ros­
zak, Neville and Reich can only look on in disillusion­
ment as the counter-culture becomes swiftly and pain­
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lessly absorbed into the bourgeois ethos. Charles 
Reich, in fact, in The Greening o f America, unwit­
tingly highlights this process.
Reich praises the emergence of the youth rebellion 
in its rejection of the materialist values of capitalist 
civilisation, and lauds it as the beginning of a super­
ior consciousness -- a state of mind which will event­
ually transform the capitalist economy and State in­
dependently of any political action. What Reich seems 
to be saying is that the capitalist State rests on nothing 
but.consciousness. Now, normally when a writer is ex­
ploring realtionships between the base of society and 
its superstructure, he should be aware that he is in con­
tentious territory. But Reich is blissfully unaware of 
any problems. While it is true that to some degree 
there is a two-way relationship between the economy 
and ideology, each element having some degree of 
autonomy, so that obviously a change in conscious­
ness is important, that cannot alone change the prop­
erty relations of the economic structure. A soc­
iety will function without crises provided that 
its productive processes are capable of meeting 
its essential needs, and its image of man and soc­
iety are capable of rationalising those processes.
A discrepancy causes conflict, and consciousness 
must be translated into action in order to trans­
cend that crisis. But to Reich, like the hippies who 
preceded him, no action is required, just drop out, 
and dream of the day when General Motors is going 
to hand over its capital to its employees. Four years 
ago, John Lennon claimed “the war is over -  if 
you want it;” but it continues today with increased 
ferocity. The Yippies’ ritualistic burning of the 
holy dollar on the floor of New York Stock Ex­
change did nothing to alter American acquisitive 
society. At any rate, Reich is forgetting that only 
a few have developed this change of consciousness, 
the children of the affluent middle class. The indivi­
dual growing up surrounded by abundance corre­
ctly perceives that the traditional bourgeois mora­
lity of hard work, competitiveness and achievement 
is obsolete. And so on to university, paid for by pa­
rents or the State (which looks after members of 
its own class). It is quite logical that he should be 
unimpressed by the prospect of living like his pa­
rents. The point is that only the affluent have been 
able to develop this change of consciousness -  and 
that affluence is based on the inequality of capita­
lism. To Marcuse, Reich’s thesis is the Establishment 
version of the revolution -- not the real one.
But even if Reich’s thesis was based on sound 
philosophical and sociological premises, history has 
already proven him wrong. Back in 1967, the “su­
perior consciousness” of the hippies may have been 
a beautiful and ominous thing to feel, but it died a 
messy and horrible death. Methedrine and peace 
made uneasy partners. Violence and commercial 
exploitation marked the end of the era. Even the 
communes dried up, and those few which survived 
started to bear an uncomfortable resemblance to
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the surrounding society. While it was a minority 
movement, its culture could remain unadulterated. 
But as soon as it was transformed into a near con­
sumer product, it was quickly absorbed by bour­
geois culture. And yet so much of the counter­
culture, dressed in Levis and riding “ freedom ma­
chines,” intent on making Dylan, Kubrik, Harry 
M. Miller, Mick Jagger, the Mafia, CBS, Abbie 
Hoffman and Peter Fonda all multi-millionaires, 
still naively holds that its adherents can remain 
aloof from bourgeois culture. But bourgeois cul­
ture is not static. It accommodates all but direct 
attacks upon itself. Instead of one cultural con­
sciousness replacing another, the two fuse and inter 
act. The counter-culture, by its very nature, was a 
confused and diffuse challenge. This, and the fact 
that its dominant characteristic is an elitist and 
fatalistic outlook, allow for few claims of revolu­
tionary potential.
I realise that I have painted the counter-culture 
with a broad brush, but these impressions are based 
on my experience, and backed up by the scanty li­
terature on the subject. Nevertheless, the counter­
culture remains an ongoing phenomenon, and it 
does consist of a vast rejection of many of the norms 
and values of capitalist society. As such it provides 
the basis for acceptance of socialist ideas by young 
people. Already there are some signs that this is hap­
pening.
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LOUIS ALTHUSSER REPLIES 
TO JOHN LEWIS
The following text is a reply to an article by John Lewis which appeared in two parts in the January and February 
issues o f  Marxism Today. The author has agreed to the addition o f  a small number o f  notes by the translator, 
Grahame Lock, designed to clarify certain points fo r  British readers. The sub-titles are also by the translator. 
The author has seen the translation and notes.
Part I
I. NEVER FORGET THE CLASS STRUGGLE!
I want to thank Marxism Today for having 
published John Lewis’ article about the books I 
have written on Marxist philosophy: For M arx  
and Reading Capital, which appeared in France in 
1965. He took care to treat me in a special way, 
in the way a medical specialist treats a patient. The 
rest of the family, as it were, stood silent and still 
at the bedside, while Dr. Lewis leaned over to 
examine “ the Althusser case” .1 He made his 
diagnosis. A very grave one: the patient is suffering 
from an attack of severe “ dogmatism” . The progno­
sis is equally grave: the patient has not long to last.
It is an honour for this attention to be paid to 
me. But it is also an opportunity for me to clear up 
certain matters, twelve years after the event. For 
my first article (reprinted in For Marx), which was 
concerned with the question of the “young M arx” , 
actually appeared in 1960, and I write in 1972.
Philosophy and Politics
A good deal of water has flowed under the: bridge 
of history since 1960. The W orkers’ Movement has 
been touched by many im portant events. It has seen 
the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China 
(1966-69). It has seen the greatest- workers’ strike 
in world history—ten million French workers on 
strike for a m onth (May 1968), as well as the 
im portant ideological revolt among French students 
and petty-bourgeois intellectuals which “preceded”
1 The title of John Lewis’ article was The Althusser 
Case. And in his conclusion, the author compares 
Marxism to . . . medicine.
and “ accompanied” it. It has seen the occupation 
of Czechoslovakia by the armies of the Warsaw 
Pact nations. It has seen the war in Ireland, & c. 
The Cultural Revolution and May 1968 have had 
ideological and political repercussions in the whole 
capitalist world.
With hindsight one can judge things better. 
With the passing of the period between the writing 
of the pieces collected in my books and the present 
time—twelve, ten, seven years—one can look back' 
and see more clearly whether one was right or wrong.
It is really an excellent opportunity.
Just one small point in this connection. John 
Lewis, in his article, never for one moment talks 
about this political history of the W orkers’ Move­
ment. In For M arx—that is, in 1965—1 was already 
writing about Stalin, about the Twentieth Congress 
of the Soviet Communist Party, and about the 
split in the International Communist Movement. 
John Lewis, on the other hand, writes as if Stalin 
had never existed, as if the Twentieth Congress and 
the split in the International Communist Movement 
had never occurred, as if the Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution had never taken place, nor the occupa­
tion of Czechoslovakia, nor the war in Ireland,
& c. John Lewis is a pure spirit, he prefers not to 
talk about such concrete things as politics.
When he talks about philosophy, he talks about 
philosophy. Just that. Full stop.
It has to be said that this is precisely what the 
majority of so-called philosophy teachers do in our 
bourgeois society. The last thing they want to talk 
about is politics! They would rather talk about 
philosophy. Full stop. That is just why Lenin,
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quoting Dietzgen, called them “graduated flunkies” 
of the bourgeois state2. What a wretched sight they 
make! For all the great philosophers in history, 
since the time of Plato, even the great bourgeois 
philosophers—not only the materialists but even 
idealists like Hegel—have talked about politics. 
They more or less recognised that to do philosophy 
was to do politics in the field of theory. And they 
had the courage to do their politics openly, to talk 
about politics.
Heaven be thanked, John Lewis has changed all 
that. John Lewis is a Marxist and we are in 1972. 
He does not feel the need to talk about politics. 
Let someone work that one out.
But to Marxism Today I must express my thanks 
for giving an important place to a discussion about 
philosophy. It is quite correct to give it this im­
portant place. The point has been made not only 
by Engels and of course by Lenin, but by Stalin 
himself! And, as we know, it has also been made 
by Gramsci and by Mao: the working class, needs 
philosophy in the class struggle. They need not only 
the Marxist ir/V«c£'of history (historical materialism), 
but also Marxist philosophy (dialectical materialism). 
Why?
I should like to reply by using a formula. I will 
take the (personal) risk of putting it this way: the 
reason is that philosophy is, in the last instance* 
class struggle in the field o f  theory.
All this is perfectly orthodox. Engels, whom 
Lenin quotes on this point in What is to he Done?, 
wrote in 1874 in a supplement to his Preface to 
The Peasant War that there are three forms of the 
class struggle. The class struggle has not only an 
economic form and a political form but also a 
theoretical form. Or if you prefer: the same class 
struggle exists and must be fought out by the pro­
letariat in the economic field, in the political field 
and in the theoretical field. When it is fought out 
in the theoretical field, the class struggle is called 
philosophy.
Now some people will say that all this is nothing 
but words. But that is not true. These words are 
weapons in the class struggle in the field of theory, 
and since this is part of the class struggle as a whole, 
and since the highest level of the class struggle is the 
political class struggle, it follows that these words 
which are used in philosophy are weapons in the 
political struggle.
Lenin wrote that “ politics is economics in a 
concentrated form ” . We can now add that philo­
- See V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-criticism, 
in Collected Works, Moscow 1962, vol. 14, p. 340. 
(Translator’s note)
3 One must always add: in the last instance, so as not 
to be misunderstood. 1 will explain in another place why 
it is necessary to be precise in this way, not simply to 
say that philosophy is class struggle in the field of theory, 
but to add that it is in the last instance that this is the 
case.
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sophy is politics in a concentrated form. This is a 
“ schematic” formula. No matter! It expresses its 
meaning quite well.
Everything that happens in philosophy has, in the 
last instance, not only political consequences in 
philosophy, but also political consequences in 
politics', in the political class struggle.
We will show in a moment why that is so.
Of course, since I cite Engels and Lenin in support 
of my point, John Lewis will surely say, once again, 
that 1 am talking like “ the last champion of an 
orthodoxy in grave difficulties” . O.K.! I am the 
defender of orthodoxy, of that “ orthodoxy” which 
is called the theory of Marx and Lenin, is this 
orthodoxy in “grave difficulties” ? Yes, it is and has 
been since it came to birth. And these grave diffi­
culties are the difficulties posed by the threat of 
bourgeois ideology. John Lewis says that 1 am 
“crying in the wilderness” . Is that so? No, it is not!
For Communists, when they are Marxists, and 
Marxists when they are Communists, never cry in 
the wilderness. Even when they are alone.
Why is that?  We shall see.
1 therefore take my stand on this theoretical 
basis of Marxism—a basis which is “ orthodox” 
precisely in so far as it is in conformity with the 
theory of Marx and Lenin. And it is on this basis 
that I want to take issue both with John Lewis and
4 See note 3. Althusser’s formulae may be compared 
with a number of propositions he put forward on the 
same question in 1969, in the article “Lenin before 
Hegel’’ (Lenin and Philosophy, pp. 103-120):
"I. Philosophy is not a science, and it has no object, 
in the sense in which a science has an object.
“2. Philosophy is a practice of political intervention 
carried out in a theoretical form.
“3. It intervenes essentially in two privileged domains, 
the political domain of the effects of the class struggle 
and the theoretical domain of the effects of scientific 
practice.
"4. In its essence, it is itself produced in the theoretical 
domain by the conjunction of the effects of the class 
struggle and the effects of scientific practice.
"5. It therefore intervenes politically, in a theoretical 
form, in the two domains, that of political practice and 
that of scientific practice: these two domains of inter­
vention being its domains, insofar as it is itself produced 
by the combination of effects from these two practices.
"6. All philosophy expresses a class position, a ‘partisan­
ship’ in the great debate which dominates the whole 
history of philosophy, the debate between idealism and 
materialism.
“7. The Marxist-Leninist revolution in philosophy 
consists of a rejection of the idealist conception of 
philosophy (philosophy as an "interpretation of the world') 
which denies that philosophy expresses a class position, 
although it always does so itself, and the adoption of the 
proletarian class position in philosophy, which is 
materialist, i.e. the inauguration of a new materialist 
and revolutionary practice of philosophy which induces 
effects of class division in theory.
“All these Theses can be found in Materialism and 
Empirio-criticism (by Lenin). All 1 have done is to begin 
to make them more explicit” . (Translator’s note)
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with my own past errors, on the basis of the need 
to carry on the class struggle in the field of theory, 
as Engels and Lenin argued, and on the basis of the 
definition of philosophy which 1 have proposed in 
this article: philosophy is, in the last instance, class 
struggle in the field o f  theory.
1 will therefore leave aside all the rather imprudent 
remarks, some of them “ psychological” , which 
John Lewis thought it useful to make at the end of 
his article, about Althusser's “whole style o f  life and 
writing". John Lewis is for example very worried, 
very put out, quite upset—good “hum anist” that he 
is—by the fact that Althusser “argues exhaustively 
and with an extreme dogmatism” , in a way which 
makes him think not so much of the Scholastics, 
who were great philosophers of the Middle Ages, 
but of the schoolmen, commentators of commenta­
tors, erudite splitters of philosophical hairs, who 
could not rise above the level of quotation. Thank 
you! But really, this kind of argument has no place 
in a debate between Communists in the journal of a 
Communist Party. I will not follow John Lewis onto 
this ground.
1 approach John Lewis as a comrade, as a militant 
of a fraternal party: the Communist Party of Great 
Britain. In the face of the history of the W orkers’ 
Movement, in the face of the theoretical and 
practical work of Marx and of Lenin, all Communist 
Parties are equal, in virtue of proletarian inter­
nationalism. And all their militants are equal.
I will try to speak plainly and clearly, in a  way that 
can be understood by all such militants.
So as not to make my reply too long, 1 will only 
take up those theoretical questions which are most 
important, politically speaking, for us today, in 1972.
II. WHAT WORRIES JOHN LEWIS?
To understand my reply, the reader must obviously 
know what John Lewis, in his “ radical” critique of 
my “ philosophical writings” , essentially holds 
against me.
In a few words, we can sum this up as follows.
John Lewis holds:
1. that I do not understand M arx’s philosophy,
2. that I do not understand the history of the 
formation of M arx’s thought.
In short, his reproach is that I do not understand 
M arxist theory.
That is his right.
I will consider these two points in succession.
III.
First point: Althusser does not understand M arx's 
philosophy.
To demonstrate this point, John Lewis employs a 
very simple method. First he sets out M arx’s real 
philosophy, which is Marx as he understands him. 
Then, beside this, he puts Althusser’s interpretation. 
You just have to compare them, it seems, to see the 
difference!
Well, let us follow our guide to Marxist philosophy 
and see how John Lewis sums up his own view of 
Marx. He does it in three formulae, which 1 will call 
three Theses,s
How John Lewis sees Marx
1. Thesis no. I. It is man who makes history.
John Lewis’ proof: no need of proof, since it is
obvious, it is quite evident, everyone knows it.
John Lewis’ example: revolution. Man makes 
revolution.
2. Thesis no. 2. Man makes history by remaking 
existing history, by “ transcendence” , by the “ nega­
tion of the negation” of existing history.
John Lewis’ proof: since it is man who makes 
history, it follows that in order to make history man 
must transform the history which he has already 
made (since it is man who has made history). To 
transform  what one has already made is to “ tran ­
scend” it, to negate what exists. And since what 
exists is the history which man has already made, it 
is already negated history. To make history is 
therefore “ to negate the negation” , and so on 
without end.
John Lewis’ example: revolution. To make 
revolution, man “ transcends” (“ negates” ) existing 
history, itself the “ negation” of the history which 
preceded it.
3. Thesis no. 3. Man only knows what he himself 
does.6
John Lewis’ proof: no proof, probably because of 
lack o f space. So let us work one out for him. He 
could have taken the case of science and said that 
the scientist “ only knows what he himself does” 
because he is the one who has to work out his proof, 
either by experiment or by demonstration (mathe­
matics).
John Lewis’ example: no example. So let us 
provide one. John Lewis could have taken history 
as an example: m an's knowledge of history comes 
from the fact that he is the one who makes it. This 
is like the Thesis of Giam battista Vico: verum 
factum .7
5 In a Philosophy Course for Scientists (given in 1967 
and to be published) I proposed the following definition: 
“Philosophy states propositions which are Theses". It 
therefore differs from the sciences: “a science states 
propositions which are Demonstrations".
6 See Part I of John Lewis’ article, p. 46. Lewis writes 
that Marx “does not present us with any system. Had he 
thought one necessary he would certainly have con­
structed one. What he has in mind is the development 
of consciousness, of understanding, of the possibilities, 
the problems, the opportunities and necessities in the 
actual social situation. This Marx calls praxis, because it 
is always concrete, always we are involved and acting, 
and therefore thinking as we act, and acting as we think.” 
(Translator’s note).
7 Verum factum: “ that which is true is that which has 
been done” . Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) was an
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A little Difficulty for John Lewis
These then are the three Theses which sum up 
John Lewis’ idea of Marx’s philosophy:
Thesis no. I: It is man who makes history.
Thesis no. 2: Man makes history by transcending 
history.
Thesis no. 3: M anonly knowswhat hehim self does.
This is all very simple. Everyone “ understands” the 
words involved: man, make, history, know. There is 
only one word which is a bit complicated, a “ philo­
sopher’s” word: “ transcendence” , or “ negation of 
the negation” . But if he wanted to, John Lewis could 
say the same thing more simply. Instead of saying: 
man makes history, in transcending it, by the 
“ negation o f the negation” , he could say that man 
makes history by “ transforming” it, &c. W ouldn’t 
that be more simple?
But a little difficulty still remains. W hen John 
Lewis says that it is man who makes history, 
everyone understands. Or rather, everyone thinks he 
understands. But when it is a question of going 
further, when John Lewis honestly asks himself the 
question: “ what is it that man does when he makes 
history ?” , then you realize that a nasty problem 
appears just when everything seemed simple, that 
there is a nasty obscurity just in the place where 
everything seemed clear.
W hat was obscure? The little word make, in the 
Thesis “ it is man who makes history” . W hat can this 
little word make possibly mean, when we are talking 
about history? Because when you say: “ I made a 
mistake” or “ I made a trip around the world” , 
or when a carpenter says: “ I made a table” , &c., 
everyone knows what the term “ make” means. The 
sense o f the word changes according to the expres­
sion, but in each case we can easily explain what it 
means.
For example, when a carpenter “ m akes” a table, 
that means he constructs it. But to make history? 
What can that mean? And the man who makes 
history, do you know that individual, that “ species 
of individual” , as Hegel used to say?
So John Lewis sets to work. He does not try to 
avoid the problem: he confronts it. And he explains 
the thing. He tells us: to “ make” , in the case of 
history, that means to “ transcend” (negation of the 
negation), that means to transform the raw material 
of existing history by going beyond it. So far, so 
good.
But the carpenter who “makes” a table, he has a 
“ raw material” in front of him too: the wood. And 
he transforms the wood into a table. But John Lewis 
would never say that the carpenter "transcends” the 
wood in order to “ make” a table out of it. And he is 
right. For if he said that, the first carpenter who came 
along, and all the other carpenters and all the other 
working people in the world would send him packing
Italian philosopher of history, famous for his "new 
science of humanity” . He claimed that we can know the 
social world precisely because it is we who have made it. 
He wrote the Scienza niiova. (Translator’s note)
with his “ transcendence.” John Lewis uses the term 
“ transcendence” (negation of the negation) only for 
history. W hy? We have to work out the answer, for 
John Lewis himself does not provide any explana­
tion.
In my opinion, John Lewis holds on to his 
“ transcendence” for the following reason: because 
the raw material of history is already history. The 
carpenter’s raw material is wood. But the carpenter 
who “ makes” the table would never say that he was 
the one who “ made” the wood, because he knows 
very well that it is nature which produces the wood. 
Before a tree can be cut up and sold off as planks, it 
first has to have grown somewhere in the forest, 
either in the same country or thousands of miles 
away on the other side of the equator.
Now, for John Lewis it is man who has made the 
history with which he makes history. In history man 
produces everything: it is not only the result, the 
product of his “ labour” , which is history: so is the 
raw material that he transforms. Aristotle said that 
man is a two-legged, reasoning, speaking, political 
animal. Franklin, quoted by Marx in Capital, said 
that man is a “ toolmaking anim al” . John Lewis is a 
philosopher of quite another class from Aristotle or 
Marx. John Lewis says that man is not only a tool- 
making animal, but an animal who makes history, in 
the strong sense, because he makes everything. He 
“makes” the raw material. He makes the instru­
ments of production (John Lewis says nothing about 
these—and for good reason! Because otherwise he 
would have to  talk about the class struggle, and his 
“ man who makes history” would disappear in one 
flash, together with the whole system). And he makes 
the final product: history.
A Little Human God
Do you know of any being under the sun endowed 
with such a power? Yes—there does exist such a 
being in the tradition of hum an culture: God. Only 
God “ makes” the raw material with which he 
“ makes” the world. But there is a very im portant 
difference. John Lewis’ G od is not outside of h istory : 
he is inside. And it is just because John Lewis’ little 
human god—m an—is inside history (‘Vn situation", 
as our good Jean-Paul Sartre used to say) that Lewis 
does not endow him with a power of absolute 
creation (when one creates everything, it is relatively 
easy: there are no constraints!) but something even 
more stupefying—the power of “ transcendence” , 
of being able indefinitely to supersede the history in 
which he lives, the power to transcend history by his 
human liberty.8
8 1 do not know John Lewis’ personal philosophical 
history. But I am not sticking my neck out much in 
betting that he has a weakness for Jean-Paul Sartre. 
His Marxism in fact bears a remarkable resemblance to 
a (pale) copy of Sartrian existentialism, in a slightly 
Hegelianised version, which no doubt makes it more 
easily acceptable to Communist readers._____________
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John Lewis’ man is a little lay god. Like every 
living being he is “ up to his neck" in reality, but 
endowed with the prodigious power o f being able 
at any moment to step outside of that reality, of 
being able to change its character. A little Sartrian 
god, always "en situation" in history, endowed with 
the amazing power of “ transcending” every situa­
tion, o f resolving all the difficulties which history 
presents, and of going forward towards the golden 
future of the hum an, socialist revolution: man is a 
free  animal.
Please excuse all this if you are not a philosopher. 
We philosophers are well acquainted with this kind 
of argument. And we Communist philosophers know 
that this old line in philosophy has always had its 
political consequences.
The first people who talked about “ transcendence” 
in philosophy were the idealist-religious philosophers 
of Plato’s school: the Platonic and neo-Platonic 
philosophers. They had an urgent need of the 
category of “ transcendence” in order to be able to 
construct their philosophical or religious theology, 
and this theology was then the official philosophy of 
the slave state. N o need to say more. Later, in the 
Middle Ages, the Augustinian and Thomist theo­
logians took up the same category again and used it 
in systems whose function was to serve the interests 
of the Church and feudal state (the ideological state 
apparatus of the Church is the number one ideo­
logical state apparatus of the feudal state). No need 
to say more.
M uch later, with the rise of the bourgeoisie, the 
notion of “ transcendence” received, in Hegelian 
philosophy, a new function: the same category, but 
“wrapped” in the veil of the “ negation of the 
negation” . This time it served the bourgeois state. 
It was quite simply the philosophical name for 
bourgeois liberty. It was then revolutionary in 
relation to  the philosophical systems of feudal 
“ transcendence” . But it was one hundred per cent 
bourgeois, and that is the way it stays.
Since that time, Jean-Paul Sartre has taken up the 
same idea once more, in his theory of man "en 
situation"', the petty-bourgeois version of bourgeois 
liberty. And Sartre is not alone, for transcendence 
has flourished even since his early days, among for 
example large numbers of theologians, both reac­
tionary and avant-garde, and even among the “ red” 
theologians of Germany and Holland, of Spain and 
Latin America. The bourgeois no longer needs to 
believe—and anyway has for thirty years no longer 
been able to believe—that his liberty is all-embracing. 
But the petty-bourgeois intellectual, yes! The more 
his liberty is crushed and denied by the development 
of imperialism, the more he exalts its power (“ trans­
cendence” , “ negation o f the negation”). The 
“conscious” petty-bourgeois exists in his perfect 
form only when he protests. The petty-bourgeois 
ideologist is an animal of protest!
John Lewis now, in 1972, takes up the old argu­
ments in his turn, in the theoretical journal of the
British Communist Party. He can, if I may say so, 
rest assured: he is certainly not crying in the wilder­
ness! He is not the only person to take up this 
theme. He is in the company of many Communists." 
Everyone knows that. But why should it be that 
since the nineteen-sixties it has been so easy to find 
Communists eager to resurrect this worn-out 
philosophy of petty-bourgeois liberty and yet still 
claiming to be M arxists?
We shall see.
IV. WHAT DOES MARXISM SAY A BOLT 
HISTORY?
But first, 1 shall do like John Lewis. I shall compare 
John Lewis’ “ Marxist” Theses with the Theses of 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy. And everyone will be 
able to see the difference and judge.
1 will go over the points in John Lewis’ order. That 
way things will be clearer. I am making an enormous 
concession to John Lewis by taking hisorder, because 
his order is idealist. But we will do him the favour.
To understand what follows, note that in the case 
of each Thesis (1,2,3) I begin by repeating Lewis’ 
Thesis and then state the Marxist-Leninist Thesis.
1. Thesis no. 1.
John Lewis: It is man who makes history.
Marxism-Leninism: It is the masses which make 
history.
W hat are these masses which “ make history” ? 
In a class society they are the exploited masses, that 
is, the exploited social classes, social strata and social 
categories, grouped around the exploited class 
capable of uniting them in a movement against the 
dominant class which holds state power.
The exploited class capable of doing this is not 
always the most exploited class, or the most wretched 
social “ stratum ” .
In Antiquity, for example, it was not the slaves 
(except in a few periods—Spartacus) who “ m ade” 
history in the strong, political sense of the term, but 
the most exploited classes among the “ free” men (at 
Rome, the urban or rural “ plebs” ).10
In the same way, under capitalism the “ lumpen- 
proletariat” , as Marx called it, groups together the 
most wretched of men. But it is not a class, and 
certainly not the class which is exploited in capitalist 
production: that is, the proletariat. It is around the 
proletariat that you will find grouped the masses who
9 Althusser is of course not only or even specially 
referring to the British Communist Party. His argument 
is that the struggle between the positions he outlines is 
taking place or must take place wherever what he calls 
bourgeois and petty-bourgeois Theses have penetrated 
Marxism. (Translator’s note)
10 It is not certain—here I shall have to bow to the 
judgement of Marxist historians—that the slave class 
did not, in spite of everything, quietly but genuinely 
“make history” . The transition from the small-property 
slave system to the.large-scale system at Rome had its 
historical effects.
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“ make history” , who are going to “ make history”— 
that is, who are going to make the revolution which 
will break ou t in the “weakest link” of the world 
imperialist chain.
Against John Lewis’ Thesis—it is m an who makes 
history— Marxism-Leninism has always opposed the 
Thesis: it is the masses which make history. Under 
capitalism, the masses can be defined as the set of 
exploited classes, strata and categories grouped 
around the exploited class in large-scale production, 
around the only class capable of directing their 
action against the bourgeois state. Com pare the 
two Theses.
2. Thesis no. 2.
John Lewis: Man makes history by “ transcending” 
history.
Marxism-Leninism: The class struggle is the motor 
o f  history (Thesis of the Communist Manifesto, 1847).
Here things become extremely interesting. Because 
Marxism-Leninism blows up John Lewis’ whole 
philosophical system. How?
John Lewis has said: it is man who makes history. 
To which Marxism-Leninism replied: it is the masses.
But if we went no further, we would give the 
impression that Marxism-Leninism gives a different 
reply to the same question. That question being: 
who makes history ? This question therefore supposes 
that history is the result of the action of a subject, 
of what that subject does. For John Lewis, the 
subject is man. For Marxism-Leninism, the subject 
would be the masses.
Yes and no. When we started to sketch out a 
definition of the masses, when we argued about this 
idea of the masses, we saw that the whole thing was 
rather complicated. The masses are actually several 
social classes, social strata and social categories 
grouped together in a way which is both complex 
and changing (the positions of the different classes 
and strata, and of course the fractions of classes 
within the classes, change in the course of the 
revolutionary process itself). And we are dealing 
with huge numbers: in France and Britain, for 
example, with millions of people, in China with 
hundreds of millions! Can anyone still claim that 
we are talking about a "subject"! Com pared with 
John Lewis’ “ subject” , as simple and neat as you 
can imagine, the masses, considered as a “ subject” , 
pose nasty problems of identity and identification. 
A subject is a being about which we can say: 
“ that’s it!” How do we do that when the masses 
are supposed to  be the “subject” ?
It is precisely the Thesis of the Communist 
Manifesto—“ the class struggle is the m otor of 
history”—that brings this problem into the open, 
which shows us how to pose it properly and there­
fore how to solve it.
It is the masses which “make” history, but “ it is 
the class struggle which is the m otor of history” . 
To John Lewis’ question: “ how does m an make 
history?” , Marxism-Leninism replies by replacing 
his idealist philosophical categories with categories
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o f a quite different kind.
The question is no longer posed in terms of "man”. 
That much we know. But in the proposition that 
“ the class struggle is the motor of history” , the 
question of “ making” history is also eliminated. It 
is no longer, that is, a question of looking for a 
“subject” of history. It is no longer a question of 
who makes history.
Marxism-Leninism, then tells us something quite 
different: that it is the class struggle (new concept) 
which is the motor (new concept) of history, it is 
the class struggle which moves history, which 
advances it. This Thesis is o f very great importance, 
because it puts the class struggle in the front rank.
Absolute Primacy of the Class Struggle
In the preceding Thesis: “ it is the masses which 
make history” , the accent was put (1) on the ex­
ploited classes grouped around the class capable 
of uniting them, and (2) on their power to carry 
through a revolutionary transform ation of history. 
It was therefore the masses which were put in the 
front rank.
In the Thesis taken from  the Communist Mani­
festo, what is put in the front rank is no longer the 
exploited classes, &c., but the class struggle. This 
Thesis is decisive for Marxism-Leninism. It draws 
a radical demarcation line between revolutionaries 
and reformists.
For the reformists (even if they call themselves 
Marxists) it is not the class struggle which is in the 
front rank: it is the classes. Let us take a simple 
example, and suppose that we are dealing with just 
two classes. For the reformists these classes exist 
before the class struggle, a bit like two football 
teams exist, separately, before the match. Each 
class exists in its own camp, lives according to its 
particular conditions of existence. One class may be 
exploiting another, but for reformism that is not 
the same thing as class struggle. One day the two 
classes come up against one another and come into 
conflict. They begin a hand-to-hand battle, the 
battle becomes acute, and finally the exploited class 
defeats its enemy. That is revolution. However you 
turn the thing around, you will always find the same 
idea here: the classes exist before the class struggle, 
independently of the class struggle. The class struggle 
exists only afterwards.
Revolutionaries, on the other hand, consider that 
it is impossible to separate the classes from class 
struggle. The class struggle and the existence of 
classes are one and the same thing. In order for 
there to be classes in a “ society” , the society has 
to be divided into classes: this division is the ex­
ploitation of one class by another. It is therefore 
the class struggle, for exploitation is already class 
struggle. You must therefore begin with the class 
struggle if you want to understand class division 
and the classes. The class struggle must be put in the 
front rank.
But that means that our Thesis 1 (it is the masses
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which make history) must be explained in terms of 
Thesis 2 ( the class struggle is the motor o f  history). 
That means that the revolutionary power of the 
masses comes from the class struggle. And that 
means that it is not enough, if you want to under­
stand what is happening in the world, just to look 
at the exploited classes. You also have to look at 
the exploiting classes. Better, you have to go beyond 
the football match idea, the idea of two antagonistic 
groups of classes, to examine the basis of the 
existence not only of classes but also of the antagon­
ism between classes: that is, the class struggle. 
Absolute primacy of the class struggle (Marx, 
Lenin). Never forget the class struggle (Mao).
Now the class struggle does not go on in the air, 
or on something like a football pitch. It is rooted in 
the mode of production and exploitation in a given 
class society. You therefore have to consider the 
material basis of the class struggle, that is, the 
material existence of the class struggle. It is the unity 
of the relations of production and the productive 
forces o f a given mode of production, in a concrete 
historical social form ation, which is at the same time 
the “ basis” (M arx) of the class struggle and its 
material existence. It is this profound truth which 
Marxism-Leninism expresses in the well-known 
Thesis o f class struggle in the infrastructure, in 
the economy, in class exploitation, and in the Thesis 
that all the forms of the class struggle are rooted in 
economic class struggle.
When that is clear, the question of the “subject" 
of history disappears. History is an immense 
natural-human system in movement, and the m otor 
of history is class struggle. History is a process, and 
a process without a subject.'1
The question about how “man makes history" 
disappears altogether. Marxist theory leaves it to 
bourgeois ideology.
And with it disappears the “ necessity” of the 
concept of “ transcendence” and its subject, man.
That does not mean that “ men” , the individuals, 
disappear. For social classes are made up of human 
individuals. But these classes are certainly not just 
all those individuals “added together” . They have 
material conditions of existence. Nor does it mean 
that the question of political action disappears: 
for the class struggle, in the last instance, is practical, 
which means that it is a struggle of the organised 
masses for the conquest and retention of state 
power. N or does it mean that the question of the 
revolutionary party  disappears, because without 
such a party the conquest of state power by the 
exploited masses under the leadership of the pro­
letariat is impossible.
But it does mean that the “ role of the individual 
in history” , the existence, nature, objectives and 
practice of the revolutionary party are not deter­
mined by “ transcendence” , that is, by the free will
11 This idea 1 put forward in a brief study called “On 
the Relation of Marx to Hegel” (February 1968).
of “ m an” . They are determined by the class struggle, 
by the state of the W orkers’ Movement, by the 
ideology of this movement (petty-bourgeois or 
proletarian), by its forms of organisation and its 
relation to the scientific theory of the class struggle, 
Marxist theory. All Communists know that.
3. Thesis No. 3
John Lewis: Man only knows what he himself does. 
Marxism-Leninism: One can only know what exists.
A big difference! For John Lewis man only 
knows what he himself “ does” . For dialectical 
materialism, the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, 
one can only know what exists. That is the basic 
materialist Thesis: the primacy of being over thought.
That is where we have to begin in philosophy.
Materialism and Science
This Thesis is at one and the same time a Thesis 
about existence, about materiality and about 
objectivity. It means not only that one can only 
know what exists, but also that what exists is 
both "material" —that is, distinct from the "mental" 
character of the thought by which it is known— 
and objective—that is, exists independently of the 
subjectivity which knows it.
That of course does not mean that Marxist 
philosophy denies the activity of thought, that it 
denies practical scientific work, the work of experi­
ment in the natural sciences or the work of historical 
experiment represented by political work (for M arx­
ists, the proletarian class struggle). On the contrary! 
Marx and Lenin even said that certain idealist 
philosophers (Hegel, for example) had understood 
the principle of this activity better than certain 
materialist philosophers. That is how we "get into” 
the dialectical Theses of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. 
But—and here it differs fundamentally from John 
Lewis— Marxism-Leninism has always subordinated 
the dialectical Theses to the materialist Theses. It is 
thanks to scientific work that we can know what 
exists. But we only ever have knowledge of what 
exists. Knowing something is not the same as 
“ making” or “doing” it.
As far as nature is concerned, there is no problem. 
Who would argue that it was man who “made” the 
nature which he comes to know! Only idealists, or 
rather only that crazy species of idealists who 
attribute G od’s omnipotence to man. Even idealists 
are not normally so stupid.
But what about history? We know that the 
Thesis: “ it is man who makes history” has, literally, 
no meaning. But a trace of it remains in the idea 
that history is easier to understand than nature 
because it is “hum an” . That is the idea of G iam ­
battista Vico.
Well, Marxism-Leninism is categorical on this 
point. History is as difficult to understand as nature. 
Or, rather, it is even more difficult to understand. 
Why? Because “ men” always think they understand 
it, because each ruling and exploiting class offers 
them “ its” explanation of history—in the form of
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its own dom inant ideology, which serves its class 
interests and keeps “men” under its heel.
Look at the Middle Ages. The Church offered 
all its flock—that is to say, primarily the exploited 
masses—a very simple and clear explanation of 
history. History is made by God, and obeys the 
laws or follows the ends of Providence.
Look at the eighteenth century in France. The 
situation is different: the bourgeoisie is not yet in 
power, it is critical and revolutionary. And it offers 
to everyone (without distinction of class, not only 
to the bourgeoisie itself and its allies but also to the 
people it exploits) an “enlightened” explanation of 
history: history is moved by Reason, and it obeys 
the laws or follows the ends of Truth, Reason and 
Liberty.
If history is difficult to understand scientifically, 
it is because between real history and men there 
always come a class-ideological explanation of 
history, a class philosophy o f  history in which the 
masses spontaneously believe. Why? Because this 
ideology is pumped into them by the ruling or 
ascending class, and serves class exploitation. In 
the eighteenth century the bourgeoisie is already an 
exploiting class.
To succeed in piercing this ideological and 
idealist “smokescreen” of the ruling classes, the 
special circumstances of the first half of the nine­
teenth century were required: the class struggles 
following the French Revolution, the first proletarian 
class struggles, plus English political economy, 
plus French socialism. The result of these circum- 
staces was M arx’s discovery. He was the first to 
open up the “continent” of history to scientific 
knowledge.
But in history, as in nature, man only knows 
what exists. There is no automatic relation between 
what he knows and what he “ does” . The fact that, 
in order to get to know what really does exist, an 
enormous am ount of scientific work and gigantic 
practical struggles were necessary, does not disprove 
the point. One can only know what exists.
But we must go further. You will notice that I 
said that the Marxist-Leninist Thesis is not Man  
can only know “what exists” , but: “ one can only 
know what exists” . Here too the term “ m an” has 
disappeared. We should say in this respect that 
scientific history, like all history, is a “process 
without a subject” , and that scientific knowledge, 
even when it is the work of a particular individual 
scientist, is actually the result of a complex process 
which has no real subject or goal. That is how it is 
with M arxist science. It was Marx who “ discovered” 
it, but as the result of a complex process, combining 
Germ an philosophy, English political economy 
and French socialism, the whole thing based on the 
struggles between the bourgeoisie and working 
class. All Communists know that.
Scientists, in general, do not know it. But if they 
are prepared to, Communists can help to  persuade 
scientists (including natural scientists, including
30
mathematicians) of its truth. Because all scientific 
knowledge really is the result of a process without 
any subject or goal. This is undoubtedly a Thesis 
which is difficult to understand. But it gives a very 
im portant insight, not only into scientific work 
but also into the political struggle.
Yes, it has both scientific and political con­
sequences.
You will remember the definition o f philosophy 
which I proposed: philosophy is, in the last instance, 
class struggle in the field of theory.
If philosophy is class struggle in the field of 
theory, it is political. And it has political effects. 
But if it is class struggle in the field o f theory, it 
has theoretical effects, both in the sciences and in 
certain ideologies. It also o f course has effects in 
all the other fields of hum an activity, from the 
“ struggle for production” (M ao) to  art, etc.
But I cannot deal with everything here. I will just 
say that, as class struggle in the field o f theory, 
philosophy has two main effects: in politics and 
in the sciences, in political practice and 
in scientific practice. All Communists know that, 
or ought to  know it, because Marxism-Leninism 
has never ceased to repeat it and to argue for it.
Part II
PHILOSOPHY AND REVISIONISM  
I
Let us prove the point about the scientific and 
political effects o f philosophical Theses by com­
paring John Lewis’ Theses with the Theses of 
Marxism-Leninism. That way we shall be able to 
see how philosophy “functions” .
John Lewis' Thesis: It is man who makes history.
Theses o f  Marxism-I.eninism: It is the masses 
which make history. The class struggle is the motor 
o f history.
Let us look at the effects o f these Theses.
Effects in the Field of Science
When someone now, in 1972, defends the Thesis 
that it is man who makes history, what effect does 
that have as far as the science o f history is concerned ? 
Can one make use o f it to produce some scientific 
knowledge?
In fact, it is of no use at all from this point o f view. 
John Lewis does not show how one could get 
anything out of it which might be of use in teaching 
us about the way the class struggle works. You 
might say that he lacked the space to do so in a 
single article. So let us turn to his “ M aster” , Jean- 
Paul Sartre, to the philosopher of “ human liberty” , 
o f man-projecting-himself-into-the-future (transcen­
dence), of man “en situation", “ transcending his
1 See John Lewis, The Althusser Case, in Marxism 
Today, January and February 1972. (Translator’s note)
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place in the world” by his liberty. This famous 
philosopher has written two enormous books— 
Being and Nothingness (1939), and later a book which 
deals with history and Marxism, Critique o f  Dia­
lectical Reason (1960). More than two thousand 
pages. Did Jean-Paul Sartre manage to use the 
Thesis that “ it is man who makes history” to 
produce some scientific historical knowledge? Did 
this Thesis enable him to produce scientific know­
ledge which would help us act in history? No. Not 
a single bit o f  scientific knowledge came out of it.
But someone will say: here’s an example that 
proves the opposite o f your Thesis about philospohy! 
For this “ hum anist” philosophy has no effect a t all 
on scientific knowledge. Sorry! I claim that the 
Thesis defended by John Lewis and Jean-Paul 
Sartre really do have an effect: they prevent the 
development of existing scientific knowledge. They 
are an obstacle to  knowledge. Instead o f helping it 
to progress, they hold it back. More precisely, they 
take knowledge back to the state it was in before 
the scientific discoveries and developments made by 
Marx and Lenin. They take things back to the pre- 
scientific state.
It is not the first time that this has happened in 
the history of humanity. For example, half a century 
after Galileo—that is, half a century after physics 
had been founded as a science—there were still 
philosdphers who defended Aristotelian “ physics” ! 
They attacked Galileo’s discoveries and wanted to 
take knowledge of the natural world back to its 
pre-scientific Aristotelian state. There are no longer 
any Aristotelian “ physicists” , but the same thing is 
happening in other fields. For example: there are 
anti-Freudian “ psychologists” . And there are anti- 
Marxist philosophers of history, who carry on as if 
Marx had never existed, or had never founded a 
science. They may be personally honest. They may 
even, like Sartre, want to “help” Marxism and 
psychoanalysis! But it is not their intentions that 
count. W hat count are the real effects in science of 
their philosophy. The fact is that although he has 
Marx and Freud before him, Sartre is a pre-M arxist 
and pre-Freudian ideologist. Instead of helping to 
build on the scientific discoveries of Marx and 
Freud, he mixes things up and paralyses research.
That is how philosophy “works” in the sciences. 
Either it helps them  to produce new scientific 
knowledge, or it tries to  wipe out these advances and 
drag humanity back to a time when the science did 
not yet exist. Philosophy therefore works in the 
sciences in a progressive or retrogressive way.
You can see what is at stake. It is not enough to 
say that what John Lewis or Sartre says does not 
help us to  produce any scientific knowledge of 
history. It is not even enough to say that what they 
say represents an  “epistemological obstacle” 2 (to
2 Epistemology: literally, talk (logos) about science
(episteme). Normally used to designate philosophical
investigation of scientific practice. [Translator’s note]
use Gaston Bachelard’s term).3 We are forced to say 
that their Thesis produces effects which are extremely 
harmful to scientific knowledge, retrogressive effects, 
because instead of helping us, in 1972, to  understand 
the great scientific treasure that we possess in the 
knowledge given us by Marx, they go back to zero. 
They take us back to the good old days of Hegel 
and Feuerbach, to the time before M arx’s discovery, 
before his “epistemological break” .4 They mix 
everything up, and thus they disarm revolutionary 
philosophers, theoreticians and militants. They 
disarm them because in effect they deprive them of 
an irreplacable weapon: the objective knowledge of 
the conditions, mechanisms and forms of the class 
struggle.
The Function of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy
If you now look at the Marxist-Leninist Theses— 
“ it is the masses which make history” , “ the class 
struggle is the m otor of history”—the contrast is 
striking. These Theses are on the side o f  a scientific 
understanding of history. They do not ignore 
M arx’s scientific discovery. On the contrary. These 
philosophical Theses are also proven propositions 
of the science o f history, of historical materialism.6
These Theses, then, take account of the existence 
of the science of history. But at the same time they 
help the working out o f new explanations, of new 
scientific discoveries. For example, they force us to 
define the masses which are “ making” history: in 
class terms. Then again, they force us to define 
the form of union between the classes which make 
up the masses. As far as we are concerned, they put 
the working class in the forefront. They force us to 
define the proletariat as the class whose conditions 
of exploitation render it capable of directing the 
struggle of all the oppressed and exploited classes, 
the struggle to take the state power held by the 
imperialist bourgeoisie, These Theses allow us to  
understand that the “class struggle” is the “ m otor of 
history” , they force us “ never to  forget the class 
struggle” .
3 Gaston Bachelard: French philosopher, now dead, 
who introduced the idea of the epistemological obstacle— 
an obstacle to the development of science. [Translator’s 
note]
4 Epistemological break: a point of no return in 
theoretical history. When we examine the history of a 
science, we find that it does not grow in a gradual way 
out of pre-scientific ideas, but breaks with these ideas 
and replaces them with a new system. Althusser holds 
that the ideas expressed by Marx in his early works were 
still of a pre-scientific character. He therefore had to 
break with these ideas, and replace them—though not of 
course all at once, for such a break involves a struggle— 
with scientific ideas. Thus he founded the science of 
history (historical materialism), in very much the same 
way, to take an example, as Galileo founded the science 
of physics. [Translator’s note]
6 Scientific propositions can therefore “function” as 
philosophical Theses. This is a point which deserves to 
be considered more closely.
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The theoretical consequences of these propositions 
are known to every Communist. They require us, for 
example, to break with the bourgeois conception of 
political economy (Capital is subtitled: A Critique 
o f  Political Economy), of the state, of ideologies, 
o f “culture” , etc., etc. These Theses help to stimulate 
scientific research in the field of the science of 
history.
On the one hand, then, we have philosophical 
Theses which have retrogressive effects, in relation 
to theoretical work, on the science of history. On 
the other hand we have philosophical Theses which 
have progressive effects, in relation to theoretical 
work, in the existing fields of the Marxist science of 
history, and revolutionary effects in the fields which 
this science has not yet really touched (for example, 
in anthropology, in the history of the sciences, in 
art, in philosophy, etc., etc.).
That is what is a t stake, for science, in the class 
struggle in the field of theory.
Political effects
I think that, as far as political effects are con­
cerned, things are rather clear.
How could one carry on the class struggle on the 
basis o f the philosophical Thesis: “ it is man who 
makes history” ? It might be said that this Thesis 
serves everyone, without distinction, whether he be a 
capitalist, a petty-bourgeois or a worker, because 
these are all “men". But that is not true. It serves 
those whose interest it is to talk about “ m an” and 
not about the masses, about “m an” and not about 
classes and the class struggle. Above all, it serves the 
bourgeois class. It also serves the petty-bourgeoisie. 
In his Critique o f  the Gotha Programme, Marx 
wrote: “ The bourgeois have very good grounds for 
falsely ascribing supernatural creative power to 
hum an labour” .6 W hy? Because by making “ men” 
think that “ labour is the source of all wealth and all 
culture” , the bourgeoisie can keep quiet about the 
power of nature, about the decisive importance of 
the natural, material conditions of hum an labour. 
And why does the bourgeoisie want to keep quiet 
about the natural-material conditions o f labour? 
Because it controls them. The bourgeoisie knows 
what it is doing.
If the workers are told that “ it is men who make 
history” , that helps to disarm them. It tends to make 
them think that they are all-powerful as men, 
whereas in fact they are disarmed as workers in the 
face of the power which is really in com m and: 
that of the bourgeoisie, which controls the material 
and political conditions determining history. The 
humanist line turns them away from  the class 
struggle, prevents them from making use of the 
only power they possess: that of their organisation
6 Marx was therefore criticising the socialist John 
Lewises of his time, inscribed in the Unity Programme of 
the German Social-Democratic Party and Lassalle’s 
Party: “Labour is the source o f all wealth and all culture 
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as a class, by means of their class organisations (the 
trade unions, the party).
On the one hand, then, we have Theses which 
directly help the working class to understand its 
role, its conditions of existence, of exploitation and 
of struggle, which help them to create organisations 
which will lead the struggle of all exploited people 
to seize state power from the bourgeoisie.
No need to say more.
None of this is affected by the fact that these 
bourgeois or petty-bourgeois Theses are defended, 
in 1972, by a militant of a Communist Party. Read 
chapter 3 o f the Communist Manifesto. You will see 
that in 1847 Marx distinguished three kinds of 
socialism: reactionary (feudal, petty-bourgeois, 
humanist1) socialism, conservative or bourgeois 
socialism, and critical-utopian socialism and com ­
munism. You have the choice! Read the great 
polemical writings of Engels and of Lenin about the 
influence of bourgeois ideology in the workers’ 
parties (reformism, revisionism). You have the 
choice!
What we want to know now is how, after so many 
solemn warnings and so many testing experiences, 
it is possible for a Communist—John Lewis—to 
present his “ Theses” as Marxist.
We shall see.
II
But first, I will deal with John Lewis’ second 
reproach: that Althusser does not understand the 
history o f  the formation o f  M arx's thought. I will 
deal with it briefly, so as not to hold up the reader.
Does Something Really Happen in 1845?
Here I must make my “ self criticism” , and give 
way to John Lewis on one precise point.
In my first essays, I suggested that after the 
“epistemological break of 1845 (after the discovery 
by which M arx founded the science of history) the 
philosophical categories of alienation and o f the 
negation o f  the negation disappear. John Lewis 
replies that this is not true. And he is right. You 
certainly do find these concepts (directly or indirectly) 
in the German Ideology, in the Grundrisse (two texts 
which Marx never published) and also, though much 
more rarely, in Capital (the negation of the negation, 
for example, appears only once).
On the other hand John Lewis would have a hard 
job finding these concepts in the Communist Mani­
festo, in the Poverty o f  Philosophy, in Wage Labour 
and Capital, in his Contribution to the Critique o f  
Political Economy, in the Critique o f  the Gotha 
Programme or in the Notes on Wagner's Textbook. 
And this is to cite only theoretical texts. As far as the
7 Marx called it German or “True” Socialism. He 
writes that these German literati “wrote their philo­
sophical nonsense beneath the French original. For 
instance, beneath the French criticism of the economic 
functions of money, they wrote ‘Alienation of Humanity’
. . .” [Translator’s note]
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political texts are concerned—and this of course is 
equally true of the political texts of Lenin, Gramsci 
or M ao—well, he can always try!
But in any case, formally speaking John Lewis is 
right. And so, even if his argument in fact depends 
on leaving aside all the texts which could bother 
him, I must nevertheless reply.
Here, briefly, is my reply.
I. If you look at the whole of Marx's work, there 
is no doubt that there does exist a "break” in 1845. 
Marx says so himself. But no-one should be believed 
simply on his word, not even Marx. You have to 
judge on the evidence. Nevertheless, the whole of 
Marx’s work shows him to be right on this point. 
In 1845 Marx began to “ lay dow n" the foundations 
of a science which did not exist before he came 
along: the science of history. And in order to do that 
he set out a number of new concepts which cannot 
be found anywhere in his humanist works of youth: 
mode o f  production, productive forces, relations o f  
production, infrastructure-super structure, ideologies, 
etc. No-one in the world can deny that.
If John Lewis still doubts the reality of this 
“ break” , or rather of this irruption of a new science 
in a still “ ideological” or pre-scientific universe, he 
should compare two judgements made by Marx 
on Feuerbach and Proudhon.
Feuerbach is described in the 1844 Manuscripts as 
a philosopher who has made extraordinary dis­
coveries, who has discovered both the basis and the 
principle of the critique of political economy. But a 
year later, in the Theses on Feuerbach, and in the 
German Ideology, he is the object o f an all-out 
attack. After that he simply disappears.
Proudhon is described in the Holy Family (end 
of 1844) as the “ scientific theoretician of the French 
proletariat” . But in 1847, in the Poverty o f  Philo­
sophy, he gets a hiding from which he will never 
recover. After that he simply disappears.
If, as John Lewis says, nothing really happened in 
1845, and if everything that I have said about the 
“epistemological break” is “ a complete m yth” , 
then I’ll be hung for it.
II. So something irreversible really does start in 
1845: the “epistemological break” is a point of no 
return. Something begins which will have no end. 
A “continuous break” , I wrote, the beginning o f a 
long period of work, as in every other science, And 
although the way ahead is open, it is difficult and 
sometimes even dramatic, marked by events— 
theoretical events—which concern the scientific 
knowledge of a particular object: the conditions, the 
workings and the forms of the class struggle. In 
simpler terms, the science of history.
We can say, then, that this science does not 
emerge, ready-made, from M arx’s head. It merely 
has its beginning in 1845, and has not yet got rid of 
all its past—of all the ideological and philosophical 
prehistory out o f which it emerges.
We can add: look at M arx’s texts, look at the 
birth and development of his scientific concepts,
and—since John Lewis insists on talking about 
them—you will at the same time see the gradual 
disappearance of these two philosophical categories 
inherited from the past and still subsisting as 
remnants, known as alienation and the negation o f  
the negation. Now in fact, the more we advance in 
time, the more these categories disappear. Capital 
speaks only once of the negation of the negation 
(in 2,500 pages!). It is true that Marx several times 
uses the term “alienation” . But all that disappears in 
M arx’s later texts and in Lenin.8 Completely. We 
can therefore say: what is important is the tendency. 
And M arx’s scientific work does tend to get rid of 
these philosophical categories.
A Self Criti ism
III. But this is not enough. And here is my self 
criticism.
I was not attentive enough to the fact which John 
Lewis points out, that is, to the fact of the continuing 
presence of the said philosophical categories after 
the "epistemological break” . And that was because 
I identified the "epistemological break” with Marx’s 
philosophical revolution. More precisely, I never 
separated M arx’s philosophical revolution and the 
“epistemological break” . I talked about philosophy 
as if it were science, and wrote that in 1845 Marx 
made a double break, scientific and philosophical.
That was a mistake. It is an example of the 
deviation of theoreticism which I denounced in the 
brief self criticism contained in the Preface to the 
Italian edition of Reading Capital (1966). This 
Preface was reproduced in the English edition. The 
mistake consists in thinking that philosophy is a 
science and that, like every science, it has 1. an 
object, 2. a beginning (the “epistemological break” 
takes place at the moment when it looms up in the 
pre-scientific, ideological cultural universe), and 3. 
a history (comparable to the history of a science). 
This theoreticist error found its clearest and purest 
expression in my formula: philosophy is "Theory of 
theoretical practice” .
Since that time I have begun to “ put things right” . 
In a philosophy course for scientists, dating from 
1967, and again in Lenin and Philosophy (February 
1968), I put forward other propositions:
1. Philosophy is not a science.
2. Philosophy has no object, in the sense in which 
a science has an object.
3. Philosophy has no history, in the sense in 
which a science has a history.
4. Philosophy is politics in the field of theory.
W hat are the consequences ?
1. It is impossible to reduce philosophy to 
science, and it is impossible to reduce M arx’s
8 One really must be short of arguments to have to use, 
as a proof of Lenin’s “humanist philosophy”, a few 
lines from The German Ideology (1844) which Lenin 
copied into his notebooks! John Lewis is obviously not 
worried about gaining the reputation of “schoolman” 
himself.
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philosophical revolution to the “epistemological 
break” .
2. M arx’s philosophical revolution preceded 
M arx’s “epistemological break” . It made the break 
possible.
You can of course argue quite seriously that there 
is a sense in which philosophy, as Hegel said, and as 
I repeated in Lenin and Philosophy, always ‘“lags 
behind” science or the sciences. But from another 
point o f view, which is essential here, you have to 
say the opposite, and argue that in the history of 
Marx’s thought the philosophical revolution neces­
sarily “ preceded” the scientific breakthrough.
In the case of other sciences, we lack evidence and 
proof. But in the case of Marx, what happens is that 
although the philosophical revolution and the 
epistemological break take place at the same point 
in time, it is the philosophical revolution which 
“determines” the scientific “ break” .
Concretely, that means the following. The young 
Marx, born of a good bourgeois family in the 
Rhineland, entered public life as editor of a liberal 
newspaper of the same land. That was in 1841. 
A young and brilliant intellectual, he was, within 
three or four years, to undergo an astonishing 
evolution in politics. He was to pass from radical 
bourgeois liberalism (1841-42) to petty bourgeois 
communism (1843-44), then to proletarian com­
munism (1844-45). These are incontestable facts. 
But parallel to this political evolution you can 
observe an evolution in philosophy. In philosophy, 
over the same period, the young Marx was to pass 
from a position of subjective neo-Hegelianism (of a 
Kant-Fichte type) to theoretical humanism (Feuer­
bach), before rejecting this to pass over to a philo­
sophy which would no longer merely “ interpret” 
the world, but “ change it” .
If you now compare Marx’s political evolution 
with his philosophical evolution, you will see:
1. that his philosophical evolution is based on his 
political evolution; and
2. that his scientific discovery (the “ break” ) is 
based on his political evolution.
That means, in practice, that it is because the 
young Marx went over to a revolutionary proletarian 
class position in his theoretical work that he was 
able to lay down the foundations of the scientific 
theory o f history as history of the class struggle.
IV. On the basis of these points it should be 
possible to account for the intermittent survival of 
categories like those of alienation and of the negation 
o f  the negation. Note that I talk about intermittent 
survival. For alongside their tendency to disappear 
in M arx’s work, considered as a whole, there is a 
strange phenomenon which must be accounted for: 
their total disappearance in certain works, then 
their subsequent reappearance. For example, the 
two categories in question are totally absent from 
the Communist Manifesto as well as from the 
Poverty o f  Philosophy (published by Marx in 1847). 
They are absent from his Contribution to the Critique
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o f  Political Economy (which he published in 1859). 
But there are many references to alienation in the 
Grundrisse (preparatory notes made by Marx in the 
years 1857-58, and which he did not publish). We 
know, because of a letter sent to Engels that Marx 
had, "by chance” , re-read Hegel's Logic in 1858 and 
had been fascinated by it. In Capital (1867) alienation 
comes up again, but much more rarely, and the 
negation of the negation appears just once. And 
so on.
However that might be, and in spite of all the 
work which still remains to be done, one fact is 
clear. The Marxist science of history did not progress 
in a simple straight line, under its own power, from 
the moment of the “epistemological break” on­
wards. If it is true that Marx had to go over to 
proletarian class positions in his theoretical work 
in order to be able to found the science of history, 
he did not make that transition all at once, once and 
for all, with no going back. The philosophical battle 
continued within Marx himself, in his work, around 
the principles o f the new science. The science only 
gained its ground little by little, in theoretical 
struggle, in theoretical class struggle, and in close 
relation to the class struggle going on in the world 
outside theory, This struggle lasted all of M arx’s life. 
It has continued after him, in the labour movement. 
And it continues in our own time.
It is therefore possible to understand the partial 
disappearance and reappearance of certain categories 
in M arx's work as indicative o f attempts, advances 
and failures in the long dual struggle to take up 
class positions in theoretical work and to found the 
science o f history.
Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Philosophy
When I said that it was the “epistemological 
break” which was primary, and when I  failed to 
distinguish it from the “philosophical break” , I 
therefore made two mistakes. In the case of Marx 
it is the philosophical revolution which is primary. 
And if we are allowed to keep the term “ break” to 
designate the beginning o f the science of history, the 
point of no return, we cannot use the same term for 
philosophy, because in philosophy, as fo r  long 
periods in the class struggle, there is no point o f  no 
return. We must therefore talk about “ revolution in 
philosophy” . This expression is more correct, 
because we all know that a revolution is always 
exposed to attacks, to reverses and to counter­
revolution.
Nothing then is ever definitively settled in philo­
sophy: there are always “come-backs” , and the 
oldest philosophies are always ready to m ount an 
offensive disguised in modern trappings. Why?
Because philosophy is, in the last instance, class 
struggle in the field o f theory. Because the revo­
lutionary classes are always opposed by the old 
conservative and reactionary ruling classes, who 
will never give up their ambition for revenge, even 
when they no longer hold state power. According
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to the state of affairs, they will defend their power or 
mount an assault against the new power, under the 
guise of such and such a philosophy: the one that 
serves them best, even if its is the oldest in the world. 
Tt just has to be done up a bit and given a modern 
coat of paint. Philosophical Theses have no age. 
That is the sense in which I took up M arx’s comment 
in the German Ideology that "philosophy has no 
history” .
In practice bourgeois ideology, when it is able to 
put on enough pressure, can penetrate Marxism 
itself. The class struggle in the field of theory is not 
just a phrase: it is a reality, a terrible reality. W ithout 
understanding that, it is impossible to understand 
either the dram atic history of the formation of 
M arx’s thought or the “grave difficulties” which 
even today, in '972, weigh on the “ orthodoxy” 
defended by a certain number of Communists.
The dramatic history of Marx and of his thought 
can be reduced, if we follow John Lewis, to  a 
peaceful and problem-free university career! A 
certain Marx appears on the literary and philo­
sophical scene. Quite naturally, he begins to talk 
about politics in the Communist Manifesto, then 
about economics in Capital. He founds and directs 
the First International, opposes the insurrection in 
Paris, then in the space of two months, takes a firm 
stand on the side o f the Paris Commune. He wages 
a battle to the death against the anarchists and 
followers of Proudhon, etc., etc. All that without 
the hint of a problem, of a drama, apart from all the 
assaults of the struggle, with no regard to the 
difficulties, the questions, all the torments of the 
search for “ tru th” in that struggle itself. Like a good 
bourgeois intellectual, as well installed in his thought 
as he is in the com fort of his existence, Marx (in 
this view) always thought the same thing, without a 
revolution or “ break” in his thinking. Here I will 
merely say that only someone who has no experience 
or is blind to all experience of the class struggle in 
the field of theory—or even simply of the way 
scientific research is done—could argue such 
nonsense, and thus insult the life and sufferings not 
only of Marx himself but of all Communists (and 
also o f those scientists who succeed in finding 
something out). Now, not only did Marx “ find 
something out” (and at what risk, and of what 
importance!), but he was also a leader of the 
labour movement for thirty-five years. He always 
“ did his thinking” in the struggle, that is the only 
way in which he did it.
The whole history of the labour movement is 
marked by endless crises, dramas and struggles. 
There is no need for me to go over them here. But 
as far as philosophy is concerned, we ought at least 
to mention the great struggles of Engels and Lenin 
against the intervention of bourgeois philosophy 
in Marxism and in the workers’ parties: the struggle 
against the intervention of the idealism of Duhring 
and of Bernstein, both of them declared neo- 
Kantians and humanists, whose theoretical revision­
ism covered their political reformism and political 
revisionism.
John Lewis would do well to re-read the first 
pages o f What is to he Done? In this text a petty- 
bourgeois intellectual named Lenin is defending 
Marx’s “orthodoxy” , itself “ in grave difficulties” , 
with “ extreme dogmatism” . Yes, Lenin declared 
himself proud to be attacked as a “ dogmatist” by 
the international coalition o f “critical” revisionists, 
with the “ English Fabians” and “ French Minis­
terialists” at their head! Yes, Lenin declared himself 
proud to  defend this old problem-ridden “ ortho­
doxy” , the orthodoxy of M arx's teaching. Yes, he 
thought it was “ in grave difficulties” . The cause: 
reformism and revisionism!
Some Communists, today, are thinking and doing 
the same. There certainly are not too many o f them, 
and they are rather alone. That is how things are. 
Why ? We shall see.
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Let us see why.
We have to answer two questions.
1. Why are there Communists like John Lewis 
(and there are quite a lot of them) who, in 1972, can 
openly argue in Communist journals for a philosophy 
which they call Marxist, but which is in fact simply 
a variant of bourgeois idealism ?
2. Why are the Communist philosophers who 
defend M arx’s philosophy so few in number, and 
why are they so isolated in their own parties ?
To answer these two questions, which are really 
one and the same, we must—all apologies to John 
Lewis— briefly enter the field of political history.
I have made the basic points in For Marx. But 
John Lewis does not seem to have read the political 
pages o f For Marx. John Lewis is a pure spirit.
Stalin and the Twentieth Congress
I said in For M arx that my period of philosophical 
silence ended with the Twentieth Congress of the 
Soviet Party in 1956.
That is true. Before the Twentieth Congress it was 
not possible for a Communist philosopher, at least 
in France, to publish serious philosophical texts— 
that is to say, texts which would be both deep and 
capable of being put to use ideologically and 
politically. That is the good side of the Twentieth 
Congress. From  that time on it was possible to 
publish such texts. The French Party, to take only 
one case, explicitly recognised (at the Argenteuil 
Central Committee meeting in 1966) the right of 
party members to carry out and publish their 
philosophical research.
But the “criticism of Stalin’s errors” was for­
mulated at the Twentieth Congress in terms such 
that there inevitably followed what we must call an 
unleashing of bourgeois ideological and philosophical 
themes within the Communist Parties themselves. 
This was the case above all among Communist 
intellectuals, but it also touched certain leaders and
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even certain leaderships.
Why?
Because the “criticism of Stalin’s errors” (some 
of which—and rather a lot!—turned out to be 
crimes) was made in a non-Marxist way.
The Twentieth Congress criticised and denounced 
the “cult of personality” (the cult in general, 
personality in general. . . . )  and summed up Stalin’s 
“errors” in the concept of “ violation of Socialist 
legality” . The Twentieth Congress therefore limited 
itself to denouncing certain facts about what went 
on in the legal superstructure, without relating them 
—as every Marxist analysis must do—firstly, to the 
rest of the Soviet superstructure (above all the state 
and party), and secondly, to the infrastructure, 
namely the relations o f production, class relations 
and the class struggle in the USSR.
Instead of relating the “ violations of socialist 
legality” to 1. the state, plus the party, and 2. the 
class struggle, the Twentieth Congress instead 
related them to . . . the “cult of personality” . That 
is, it related them to a concept which, as I pointed 
out in For M arx, cannot be “ found” in Marxist 
theory. I now venture to say that it can perfectly 
well be “ found” elsewhere: in bourgeois philosophy 
and psycho-sociological ideology.
If you take Communist philosophers and other 
Communist “ intellectuals” and set them officially on 
a bourgeois ideological and philosophical line, in 
order to  “criticise” a regime under which they (and 
others) have suffered deeply, you must not be 
surprised when the same Communist philosophers 
and intellectuals go straight forward on the road of 
bourgeois philosophy. It has been opened up right 
in front of them! You must not be surprised when 
they make up their own little bourgeois Marxist 
philosophy of the Rights of Man, exalting M an and 
his Rights, the first of which is liberty, whose 
reverse side is alienation. It is quite natural that they 
will lean on M arx’s early works—that is what those 
works are there for—and then on humanism in all 
its forms! Shall it be Garaudy’s socialist humanism, 
John Lewis’ humanism, the “ true” or “ real” 
humanism o f others, or even (why not?) “ scientific” 
humanism itself? Between these different varieties 
of the philosophy of human liberty, each philosopher 
can of course freely take his choice! All that is
perfectly normal.
Two Things Which are not the Same
Having said that, we must add that it is important 
not to mix things up which, politically speaking, 
ought not to be confused, things which are quite 
different from one another. The humanist reactions 
of western Communist theoreticians, and even of 
some from eastern Europe, are one thing, ft would 
however be an extremely serious political mistake, 
for example, to claim to judge and condemn—on 
account of an adjective (“ hum an” )—something like 
“socialism with a human face", a slogan under which 
the Czech masses let everyone know (even if the 
form was sometimes confused) about their class and 
national grievances and aspirations. It would be an 
extremely serious political mistake to confuse this 
national mass movement, this important historical 
fact, with the humanist pedantry of our western, 
sometimes Communist philosophers (or of such 
and such a philosopher of eastern Europe). There 
were intellectuals in the Czech national mass 
movement, but it was not a “ movement o f intel­
lectuals” . W hat the Czech people wanted was 
socialism, and not humanism. They wanted a 
socialism whose face  (not the body: the body does 
not occur in the formula) would not be disfigured by 
practices unworthy both of themselves (the Czech 
people: a people of a high political culture) and of 
socialism. A socialism with a human face. The 
adjective is in the right place. The national mass 
movement of the Czech people, even if it is no longer 
to be heard of (and the struggle is nevertheless still 
going on) merits the respect and support of all 
Communists. Exactly as the “humanist” philosophies 
of western intellectuals (at ease in their academic 
chairs or elsewhere), the philosophies o f “ Marxist 
humanism” , whether they are called “ true” or 
“scientific” , merit the criticism of all Communists.
It is for all the reasons outlined above, then, that 
there are cases like John Lewis in the western 
Communist Parties—and that there are rather a lot 
of them.
And it is for the same reasons—directly political 
reasons—that I want to repeat my thanks to Marxism  
Today, journal of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain, for accepting to publish my reply.
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BOOk
REVIEWS
THE DYNAMICS OF US CAPITALISM: Paul M. Sweezy 
and Harry Magdoff. Monthly Review Press, N.Y. 1972. 
Pp. 237. $8.95 (cloth), $3.70 (paper).
MODERN CAPITALISM and other essays: Paul M. 
Sweezy. Monthly Review Press, N.Y. 1972. Pp 184 
$1.95.
The two books under review are the latest by Sweezy 
and Magdoff and add to  the rapidly expanding list of 
publications by Monthly Review Press. The two books 
are made up of essays taken mainly from the journal 
that Sweezy and Magdoff edit, Monthly Review, and 
the respective publication dates of the essays range 
from 1965 up to 1971. The time lapse between the 
essays does not detract from their effectiveness or 
their relevance. In fact, part o f their interest lies in 
the fact that one is able to trace through them an ev­
olution of Sweezy’s and Magdoff’s critique of US cap­
italism. However, they suffer from the problem of any 
collection of essays anchored to specific topic, namely 
repetition. Sweezy acknowledges this but felt that the 
overlapping was unavoidable.
Paul Sweezy is most well known for his book Theory 
of Capitalist Development (1942), and for the book he 
co-authored with Paul Baran Monopoly Capital (1966). 
Harry Magdoff’s The Age of Imperialism (1969) is his 
most widely known work. The elaborated theoretical 
basis o f this latest collection of essays can be found in 
these books.
Yet what is so good about this recent collection for 
the reader who has not got the time to go back and 
study these earlier works is that they contain concise 
outline statements of the broader thesis held to by 
Sweezy and Magdoff.
This is especially the case with the collection 
Modern Capitalism and Other Essays which contains 
the two valuable essays ‘Modern Capitalism’ and ‘On 
the Theory o f Monopoly Capitalism’. Their central 
object of analysis is monopoly capitalism and hence 
they place a great deal of emphasis on the difference 
between monopolistic and competitive capitalism.
They claim that the basic assumptions of Marxist 
economics are only operative in competitive capit­
alism and that while Marx’s analysis was correct for 
the 19th century competitive capitalism, it has to  
be radically revised if it is to cope with present-day 
capitalism. The authors claim their Marxist lineage 
by asserting that they avail themselves of Marx’s 
powerful analytic method.
Briefly, their argument runs this way. Under com­
petitive capitalism, capitalists stay in business through 
being able to increase productivity and thereby reduce 
costs and therefore prices. Such competition ultimate­
ly leads to the weeding out of the weaker capitalists 
and results in a concentration o f capital in fewer and 
fewer hands. At a certain stage in this process, a dec­
isive change in the way the market operates occurs. 
Under monopoly capitalism the need for capital ex­
pansion continues, technological change continues 
apace, but at the same time, the now dominant cor­
porations can almost suppress price competition.
Thus there is a widening gap between production 
costs and prices. In the authors’ words, there is now 
a continual tendency for the economic surplus to  
rise.I
Such increase in profits makes possible even greater 
expansion. This leads to a central problem of monop­
oly capitalism today -  “reduced scope for expansion 
versus increased ability to expand."
“ The resolution of this contradiction”, says Sweezy, 
“becomes the key to the understanding of firm be­
haviour in the period of monopoly capitalism.”
A consequence of the emergence of this ‘new’ 
contradiction is that crucial aspects o f classical pol­
itical economy are no longer valid. Namely, the theory 
of “ the average rate o f profit has no operational sig­
nificance .......  neither does a rise or fall in the aver­
age rate of profit ......  have the significance attaching
to it in conditions of com petition.”
The main problem with monopoly capitalism today, 
according to Sweezy and Magdoff, is that it has a 
tendency to stagnation due to “over accumulation in 
relation to  the growth of consumption”. As a conse­
quence the sales effort and state expenditure now 
occupies the centre of economic analysis. This thus 
becomes the starting point of their analysis -  and by 
doing this they have shifted from a study of produc­
tion relations (the starting point o f Marx’s analysis) 
to a study of market relations.
US capitalism, the authors claim, exhibits all these 
features of monopoly capitalism and in fact the US 
provides their main empirical data (Sweezy and Mag­
doff rarely concern themselves with other developed 
capitalisms). The Dynamics of US Capitalism is more 
concerned with the concrete application of then- 
general theory of monopoly to the United States.
The most important essay in this regard is Harry 
Magdoff’s ‘Problems of United States Capitalism’ 
even though it is one of the oldest (it was written 
in 1965). Magdoff draws attention to the fact that 
even after 20 so-called boom years for American cap­
italism it is still afflicted with idle machinery and 
idle labour (unemployment in the US generally runs 
at around about six per cent). This would be worse 
says Magdoff if it was not for massive military 
spending on the part o f the US government. This is 
a perennial theme of both Sweezy and Magdoff. As 
Sweezy argues:
“Some of us have been saying for a long time now 
that if it weren’t for the enormous military outlays 
of today, the US economy would be as profoundly 
depressed as it was during the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. Can this assertion be supported by evid­
ence? I think it can. Let us add to the unemployed 
just calculated (7.9 million), the following:
in millions
Members of the Armed Forces 2.9
Civilian employees of the
defence department 1.2
Employees in defence industries 3.0
Those employed because of
indirect effects of military 
spending (multiplier - 1) 7.1
Thus, using conservative estimates where estimates
are necessary the total number of unem ployed......
works out to 25.6 per c e n t ...... For comparison, the
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highest unemployed rate ever recorded was 24.9 per 
cent at the depth of the Depression in 1933” . (‘On 
the Theory of Monopoly Capitalism’). Magdoff points 
to the way military spending acts as a backstop at 
strategic points in the business cycle. He says that 
business profits are highly volatile due to the inverse 
proportional relationship between sales and costs.
“Mild recessions can thus turn into severe depressions 
if losses in key capital goods industries force a com­
plete shutdown of many plants. However, the orders 
for military goods in the otherwise vulnerable indus­
tries help to pay for overhead costs, build resistance 
to depression losses, and inhibit the cumulative eff­
ect of recessions”.
Magdoff also locates a problem of the US economy 
in the failure of the civilian economy to fully utilise 
the economic resources of the country which is re­
flected in the declining role of capital investment.
But then this is a result o f the main functional problem 
of m onopoly capitalism. “The declining relative imp­
ortance of capital investment, even in the face of sub­
stantial military needs, should come as no surprise if 
he takes into account the tendency in a capitalist 
economy for productive capacity to outpace effect­
ive consumer demands.”
In 1965, Magdoff located the ‘present’ trouble of 
the US econom y not in competition with other cap­
italist nations but in its increasingly unfavourable 
balance o f payments. After a recession in 1957 the 
economy needed strong stimulation, more than mil­
itary spending was capable of and this meant an ever- 
increasing debt structure.
This latter focus, the focus on the monetary problems 
of American capitalism, is the strongest section of The 
Dynamics of US Capitalism, for it is here that we find 
the most clear recognition by Sweezy and Magdoff of 
the problems of WORLD imperialism. Sweezy and Mag­
doff have recently been accused of being ‘third world- 
ists’ (legitimately in my opinion) for their almost total 
lack of focus on inter-imperialist conflict and compet­
ition in favour of emphasis on the conflict between US 
imperialism and the people in the under-developed 
countries. This emphasis figures mainly in the theor­
etical articles and in the essays we have already dis­
cussed. The question of inter-imperialist competition 
just does not figure in their theorising on monopoly 
capitalism. This is because their argument is implicitly 
premised on the absolute supremacy of US imperialism 
over the world capitalist system. And even when they 
are discussing the serious problems faced by the US 
with its enormous balance of payments deficits, its 
manoeuvring is discussed in these terms: “What appears 
to be happening (i.e. 1968) is that the United States 
is moving to stake out a claim to full dominance over 
the entire capitalist world” (‘Gold, Dollars, and 
Empire’). However, their mere focus on this area has 
meant that they have come up with some important 
insights into the problems of world capitalism. In the 
same essay quoted above they say: “ ...... it is not far­
fetched to assume that not only France but the Common 
Market as a whole might elect to fight United States 
imperialism rather than join it. In monetary terms this
would mean establishing a rival currency b lo c k ......
Tariff and trade wars would again become the order 
of the d a y ...... ”
However, this is far from integrated into their total 
analysis o f world capitalism, and thus when they re­
treat from their former position on the absolute dom­
inance of US imperialism over the rest o f the capitalist 
world in the essay ‘The End of US Hegemony’ it is 
more a pragmatic response to events. After all, Nixon 
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himself had all but admitted the end of such hegemony. 
This is hardly a desirable state of affairs for revolution­
ary socialists to find themselves in. Revolutionaries 
must have a clear idea of the possible fall o f future 
events in order to be able to intervene effectively in 
them. Indeed, such under-estimation of future events 
by both Sweezy and Magdoff demands that the theor­
etical premises of their works be carefully scrutinised.
This has begun to happen and the Baran/Sweezy/ 
Magdoff thesis is being criticised more and more fre­
quently by various Marxists. The most devastating 
criticism of these various writers’ ‘third worldism’ has 
come from Ernest Mandel who has at the same time 
presented the most coherent framework for under­
standing the present inter-imperialist rivalry. An Eng­
lish communist, Bill Warren, has cast severe doubt on 
the notion that military spending in the US is as 
absolutely central to the US economy as Sweezy and 
Magdoff claim. Warren argues that the various prob­
lems faced by US capitalism could be partly surmounted 
by more sophisticated state intervention in that econ­
omy. That it has only just begun to do this is a result, 
he claims, o f the composition of the US ruling class. 
Another theorist has also challenged what appeared 
to be the stronghold of the authors under discussion. 
Ernesto Laclau claims that their theory of under­
development is too vague and general. It is not based 
on a clear specification of the modes of production 
of the under-developed countries and therefore leads 
to a false understanding of the relationship between 
the under-developed countries and the imperial met- 
ropoles and therefore of the relations between the 
social forces in the under-developed countries them­
selves. Within the American left itself Baran, Sweezy 
and Magdoff have come under increasing attack.
Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer have convincingly 
argued that finance capital retains its dominant pos­
ition within the ruling class and thereby locates con­
flicts within the US ruling class where the authors 
under discussion locate an over-riding harmony.
This review was originally going to take up the above 
questions with reference to the two books under dis­
cussion, however the problems raised spread far beyond 
its scope. The fault in Sweezy and Magdoff’s perspect­
ive lies, I believe in their ‘original sin’ of forsaking 
Marx’s theory of value in their endeavour to differ­
entiate m onopoly from competitive capitalism.
Marx’s analysis focused on the production process 
and central to this analysis was his theory o f value.
The market relations the above authors focus on are 
a result of value relations, and therefore a study of 
capitalism must begin with value relations. The 
Marxist value analysis disregards competition, for in 
the social aggregate all processes equate with total 
value. Hence the Marxist analysis does not rest on the 
assumption of competitive capitalism, but on the ab­
stract concept o f total capital. This is valid regardless 
of whether the actual capital structure is competitive 
or monopolistic. By shifting their focus from the 
production process to the level of appearances in the 
world of circulation of commodities the class content 
of the Marxist framework is lost. It is in this original 
misunderstanding o f Marxist theory that we can locate 
the authors’ under-estimation o f the working class in 
the advanced capitalist countries, their de-emphasis of 
class conflict within these countries, and their abstract 
posing of an undifferentiated global struggle between 
the third world and US imperialism. However, this is 
merely an indication of where an appraisal o f Sweezy 
and Magdoff would start, and to  finish it would demand 
an article much lengthier than the present one.
Grant Evans.
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Discussion
It is a pity that the otherwise excellent article by Joe 
Palmada in the October issue of the Australian Left 
Review had to be marred by an error in the use of stat­
istics.
In the article he uses a table of official statistics o f the 
number of industrial disputes over a number of years 
to substantiate a proposition that there is a growing 
number o f strikes associated with political and social 
issues and questions o f managerial policy.
The official statistics do not distinguish disputes ar­
ising out o f political and social issues so there is no 
way of telling how many took place on those issues.
The statistics do however distinguish disputes arising 
out of managerial policy. The trends in relation to  
these have been analysed in the table below by provid­
ing what percentage such disputes are of the total 
number of disputes. A similar analysis has been made 
of disputes arising out o f wages.
Three significant points are clearly revealed by this 
table. The first is that far from the percentage of man­
agerial disputes increasing, the trend has been for them 
to fall substantially over recent years.
The second point is that the trend for wages disputes 
has been a substantial rise over the years.
The third point is that in 1966 the proportion of 
managerial disputes was greater than wage disputes, 
but in 1970 the proportion of wage disputes was 
greater than managerial disputes. That is, over that 
period the relationship between managerial and wage 
disputes was completely reversed.
This is a sad case of an ugly little fact murdering a 
beautiful theory.
J. Hutson.
REPLY
There is an old saying that one can form two opinions 
from one set o f statistics, and both be right.
I neither agree that my argument is ‘fallacious’ nor 
that it ‘is a sad case of an ugly little fact murdering a 
beautiful theory’.
If you read carefully that section of the article again, 
you will notice that I claim that the MAIN motivation 
for the rising struggle ‘is the steady erosion of real wages
through inflationary cost spirals, monopoly manipulat­
ion of prices, and the effects o f increasing direct and 
indirect taxation’.
I also say that ‘whilst these factors constitute the 
MAIN PRESSURES propelling the spontaneous move­
ment, other issues of deeper significance are beginning 
to emerge which demand further analysis. This is the 
GROWING number of strikes associated with political 
and social issues and questions of managerial policy’.
By reducing the number of strikes on ‘managerial 
policy’ to percentages, you draw the erroneous con­
clusion that I am claiming that strikes over such iss­
ues have been increasing relatively as well as absolutely. 
You surely would not dispute that 785 disputes on 
managerial policy in 1970 is not greater than 529 in 
1966, and that this represents a growth in the number 
of disputes on this question.
The number of disputes on all causes in the statistics 
has increased and the fact that the number of disputes 
concerning managerial policy have, at the one time, 
INCREASED in number and, at the same time, de­
creased IN RELATION to the number of strikes does 
not, in my opinion, invalidate my contention that this 
is a trend which requires further analysis.
It is true, as you say, that ‘the official statistics do not 
distinguish disputes arising out of political and social 
issues, so there is no way o f telling how many took place 
on those issues’. But the statistics are grouped under 
various headings which exclude specifically ‘political 
and social’ issues.
As you are no doubt also aware, the statistics define 
‘other’ causes as disputes concerning ‘protests directed 
against persons or situations other than those dealing 
with employer/employee relationships, e.g. political 
matters, fining and gaoling of persons, protests against 
lack of work, and lack of adequate transport; non-award 
public holidays, accidents and funerals; no reason given 
for stoppages; etc.’
I think it is logical to assume that these strikes are 
included in ‘other’ causes, and this has shown, with the 
exception of 1970, a tendency to increase in number.
One must assume that the strikes around the Vietnam 
war, penal powers (1968-1969), pensions, and, more 
recently, the actions around ecological and other issues, 
are included in the category of ‘other’.
You have proved that, in relation to the total number 
of strikes, those motivated by ‘managerial policy’ show 
a decline, but you have not demolished my contention 
that the ‘growing number’ of such strikes is of no little 
significance, reflecting ‘the BEGINNING of conscious­
ness towards challenging the power base, and for great­
er workers’ participation in decision making’.
J. Palmada.
Year
Total
No.
Disputes
(1)
Disputes on 
Managerial Policy
No.
(2)
Percentage 
(2) of (1)
Disputes on 
Wages
No.
(3)
Percentage 
(3) o f (1)
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1,273
1,340
1,713
2,014
2,738
529
572
695
768
785
41%
42%
40%
38%
33%
308
316
524
637
1,168
24%
23%
30%
31%
42% 39
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